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I. INTRODUCTION
A strange feature of the contemporary antitrust system is that one can
commit a felony by pursuing a course of conduct that benefits consumers.
Under the rule of reason, which is antitrust’s principal mode of analysis, 
proof that challenged conduct is efficient is not dispositive.1  Instead, if a 
plaintiff establishes that a less restrictive alternative (LRA) existed for 
the impugned concerted activity, then the law will condemn the same.2 
Although the LRA rule does not explicitly apply to unilateral behavior, 
this Article explains that the courts have silently incorporated a 
comparable principle into their monopolization jurisprudence.  Thus, a 
dominant company can run afoul of antitrust rules for behavior that 
benefits consumers, but restricts rivals’ ability to compete more than an 
alternative form of behavior that is more conducive to competition.3 
The rationale underlying this tenet of the law, which the Author refers 
to as the welfare-maximization principle,4 is hardly esoteric.  Antitrust 
benefits society by spurring competition and thus promoting efficient
market processes that inure to the well-being of consumers.5  It is  only 
natural to suppose, then, that companies should refrain from competition-
1. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 825 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 400 (2011); Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 
98, 104 (2d Cir. 2010); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 509
(4th Cir. 2002); Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174, 170 
F.3d 897, 916 n.22 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 
1410 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991)), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g en banc, 203 F.3d 703 
(9th Cir. 2000); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1102 (1st Cir. 1994). 
2. See Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 825; Bayer AG, 604 F.3d at 104; Cont’l Airlines, 
277 F.3d at 509; Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry., 170 F.3d at 916 n.22; Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 
1103. 
3. See infra Part IV.  This phenomenon is most prevalent in technology-based 
markets in which enforcement agencies wish to ensure unfettered access to channels of 
follow-on innovation.  One can justify some such enforcement actions on the ground that 
equal—or at least viable—access to innovation platforms promises to yield long-run
gains in the form of lower prices and flourishing technologies from competing sources. 
These benefits, one might argue, exceed the gains associated with adhering to a
Schumpeterian understanding of innovation, which would embrace dominance and
proprietary control over technology.  On that view, competition law is justified in
condemning a monopolist’s unilateral conduct that benefits consumers because other, 
less restrictive forms of behavior would benefit consumers even more.  See infra Part
III.A. 
4. A number of authors have defined antitrust’s goal as being to maximize 
welfare. See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition 
Policy and Intellectual Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical 
Patent Litigation, 46 IDEA 1, 3 n.5 (2005); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, 
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38 (2001); Michael 
Sabin, Note, Antitrust and Positional Arms Races, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1023, 
1023 (2007).  It is not clear that authors using the term intend it to suggest that courts 
should give the term literal application. 
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hindering conduct for which equally efficient but less restrictive substitutes 
exist.6  So stated, the LRA rule appears to make eminent sense, as does 
the implicit analogue that underlies antitrust rules governing dominant-
firm conduct.  On this view, the law is correct to insist that companies 
conduct their affairs in a way that preserves viable paths of future
competition for their rivals. 
In fact, this aspect of the law is problematic, raising fundamental 
questions about the proper function of antitrust enforcement.  This 
Article argues that the judiciary has strayed from the proper course in
giving the rule of reason, along with section 2 of the Sherman Act, a 
more expansive role than is desirable.  The premise that market-power-
wielding companies should follow the most efficient, rather than simply
an efficient, path is flawed.  Uncritical obeisance to the goal of unbridled 
competition can blind courts to the truth that less can be more.7  As  
antitrust enforcement grows beyond a prophylactic role in outlawing 
practices that are antithetical to welfare to encompass a broader mandate— 
maximizing welfare—it blurs the important distinction between antitrust 
and regulation.8  This Article advocates for a more pronounced divide
between these discrete approaches to industrial organization. 
A threshold issue, however, and one that the academic literature has 
not explored, concerns the nature of consumer harm and its relationship
to the pertinent rule of decision.  One tends to think of “injury” for
antitrust purposes in absolute terms, such that a practice harms consumers
only if it leaves them worse off than they were before the conduct’s
inception.  So, for example, if two competitors meet in clandestine fashion 
to arrest an ongoing price war between them, the ensuing agreement to 
stabilize price does violence to consumer interests, thus justifying antitrust
condemnation.9  By contrast, were two rivals to agree to establish a joint
6. For a representative view, see Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of 
the Single-Entity Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme
Court’s Opportunity To Reject a Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 912–14. 
7. Accord Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper 
Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 411, 419 (2009) ([In 
antitrust,] “the goal of the best often seems to be an obstacle to obtaining actual 
improvements in economic welfare.  This logical fallacy is so common in policy making
that a maxim attributed to Voltaire has become a cliché in Washington to describe it:
‘making the perfect the enemy of the good.’”). 
8. See Glenn B. Manishin, No Need for Antitrust Prosecution of Google, NAT’L 
L.J., July 4, 2011, at 51, 51. 
9. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement 

























venture to share the cost and risk of developing and commercializing a 
new technology, the resulting new product would not harm but in fact 
benefit consumers, who would be better off after the venture than they
were before.10 
This account, however, is normatively incomplete.  In fact, any
conduct that is not the most consumer-friendly action that the company
would have been willing to take in the presence of a law prohibiting its 
preferred course injures consumers.  This insight, which is essential to
understanding the problems underlying antitrust’s welfare-maximization
principle, is not immediately obvious because it relies on the economic
concept of opportunity cost.  In the joint venture example, the price of 
the arrangement to consumers is the foregone benefit that the best
alternative agreement would have bestowed upon them.  If the companies 
would have been willing to pursue a venture that was equally efficacious 
in facilitating the development of the relevant technology but less 
restrictive of competition, consumers would have received not only the 
benefit of the new product but also the gains of greater competition.  As 
a result, many arrangements that leave consumers better off ex post than
they were ex ante are in fact inimical to consumer welfare.
This counterintuitive result reveals that there is technically no such 
thing as a welfare-enhancing arrangement that is not also welfare
maximizing.  The fact of consumer benefit is not a range but a precise 
point.  As a result, one cannot accurately say that a contract or dominant-
firm practice benefits consumers without saying that the relevant
conduct maximizes consumers’ well-being.  An antitrust regime founded
on consumer welfare would technically ask, therefore, whether the
challenged restraint or exclusionary practice represents the single most
welfare-maximizing form of behavior that the parties would have 
voluntarily pursued. 
A legal standard that required proof of such welfare maximization, 
however, would not only be unworkable, but also severely destructive of 
the welfare that the law seeks to promote.  Courts are institutionally
incompetent arbiters of critical facts that underlie the question whether a 
particular practice is the best one possible for consumers given the 
circumstances at hand.  To make such a determination, one would have 
to quantify the unknowable future consequences of a challenged act, 
discount them to present value, consider in addition the static price and
substitution effects of the behavior, and contrast the ensuing welfare 
figure with those arising in counterfactual scenarios.  It is often beyond 
10. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust 
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER 
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courts’ ability to establish whether a particular agreement or unilateral
practice simply effects an improvement over the status quo—omitting
opportunity cost—let alone attempt to calculate the magnitude of that 
enhancement and compare the same to but-for states of the world in an
effort to identify the optimal form of behavior.11 
This leads to an important conclusion: A meaningful analytic
distinction arises between welfare-enhancing and welfare-maximizing
behavior due to error, both on the part of the courts and on the part of
commercial actors that seek to predict the outcome of ex post antitrust 
proceedings.  We do not live in a world where courts never err, where
the cost of the judicial process is zero, and where ex ante legal certainty 
prevails.  As a result, the welfare-maximization ideal should have little if 
any place in contemporary antitrust jurisprudence. 
By omitting implicit reference to opportunity cost, the Article argues, 
courts would properly consider whether a particular form of behavior 
leaves consumers better off than if the relevant company had not acted at 
all.  In this way, courts should ask not about perfect outcomes, but merely
desirable ones.  Thus, when it asserts that a practice “benefits” consumers,
the Article means that consumers are better off with the practice than 
they would be if the actor had not acted at all.  It does not mean that the 
conduct is the single best form of behavior that could theoretically exist.
In other words, the Author’s definition of consumer benefit, unless 
otherwise made clear, omits reference to the opportunity cost of the 
pertinent conduct. 
Why are the LRA rule and its implicit analogue in monopolization 
proceedings improper?  Central to the Author’s thesis are the real but oft 
unappreciated dangers involved in requiring welfare maximization in 
lieu of welfare enhancement.  Foremost amongst these is judicial 
capacity to err in constructing the requisite counterfactual that reveals 
whether substitute paths less inimical to competition existed.12  Easily 
conceived of and applied in the few cases that are straightforward,
formulating the parameters of that hypothetical world will more often be 
a speculative exercise in which hindsight and political predisposition 
11. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the 
Consumer Viewpoint, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 707, 719 (1999) (“[H]ypothetical alternatives 
are typically speculative and not based on a reliable analysis.”).
12. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Poetic Justice, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 594 (2006)



















    
 
  
     
  
 
     
 
 
reign supreme.13  What begins with a well-intentioned alteration in the
law to induce superior outcomes in obvious situations can grow into 
something more nefarious. 
How might courts err in this manner?  There are two broad dangers. 
First, a court may pronounce a rule of decision that produces the right 
outcome in the case at hand but nefarious results in other settings.14  In
this respect, the precedential value of an antitrust decision that requires 
efficiency optimization can transcend the fact-specific environment in 
which it emerged to inform commercial decisionmaking in a wide variety of
distinct settings.  The enunciated rule may inadvertently increase the cost
of an efficient course of conduct beyond a relevant actor’s reservation level.
A “correct” decision in one setting can therefore depress incentives to
undertake desirable conduct elsewhere.  This is most likely to occur 
when courts assume that the rewards of pursuing an LRA are sufficiently
large, in light of the requisite cost and risk, that the pertinent actor would 
rather follow it than abandon the activity altogether.15 
The second danger is case specific, such that courts find antitrust 
violations where the defendant would not have willingly pursued the 
LRA ex ante.  Here, the probability of judicial error increases in proportion 
to the complexity of the given case, while the magnitude of such error 
increases with the social value inherent in the challenged behavior and 
the risk undertaken by the defendant in pursuing the same.16 Thus,
judicial efforts to maximize welfare are especially problematic in high-
stakes cases, where the likelihood and cost of error are greatest. 
A distinct ground of opposition to the LRA rule is its lack of a 
conceptual limiting principle.  Literally applied, the LRA rule would 
eliminate the distinction between antitrust and regulation.  So enforced,
the law would require companies, if they act at all, to follow a single
path—the socially optimum one.  Any departure from the same would 
invite antitrust liability.  The result would be a catastrophic decline in 
economic activity in cases where commercial actors could not identify
13. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 261, 308–14 (2010) (explaining that cognitive biases may afflict judicial analysis in 
antitrust cases).
14. One might colloquially think of this as the law of unintended consequences. 
See, e.g., Margaret Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J.
451, 451 (2007). 
15. Yet, because degradation in the magnitude and frequency of welfare-enhancing 
practices can be gradual and, almost by definition, undetectable ex post, society may
remain ignorant of the suppressive effects of the LRA rule on desirable behavior. 
16. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of 
Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171,
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ex ante the best possible course that courts would point to ex post.17  In
such a world, only the most prosaic arrangements between competitors 
would pass muster.  Few if any joint ventures, mergers, and other significant 
multiparty arrangements would survive scrutiny.18  The fact that antitrust 
law does not currently operate in this manner reveals that the courts have 
declined to bring the LRA test to its logical conclusion, which is not a 
defense but an indictment of the test itself. 
The proper solution is largely to abandon the LRA rule and its 
analogue in section 2 cases, and thus make the legality condition precisely
coterminous with whether the net but-for impact of the impugned 
behavior is positive.  This approach is particularly important in high-risk 
cases where uncertainty afflicts judicial construction of the pertinent 
counterfactual.  It would be dogmatic to argue, however, that antitrust 
should never inquire whether defendants deliberately eschewed equally 
effective arrangements that would have been significantly more conducive
to competition.  The problem lies in anchoring judicial comparison of 
good-versus-better outcomes to straightforward cases where the proclivity 
for and costs of error are low.  Only in this manner can courts avoid 
depressing desirable activity through misplaced precedent. 
As a positive matter, this Article argues that the courts have failed 
properly to anchor the LRA inquiry.  Instead of demarcating the category of
cases in which considerations of the best might feature properly, the law
has allowed such considerations to become overriding and systemic. 
Thus the principle underlying the LRA rule has transcended the Sherman
Act section 1 context to inform antitrust jurisprudence generally. This 
phenomenon has led courts and enforcement agencies to launch a perverse
attack on innovation and welfare creation.
Contemporary examples abound.  The 2011 judicial rejection of the 
Google Books Search Amended Settlement is the most dramatic
17. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 
1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1322 (discussing the Chicago School view that “inquiries as to 
reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives could be resolved only on a case-by-
case basis, with little guidance provided to businesses, future potential defendants, and 
antitrust courts”).
18. [I]f the critics’ implicit antitrust standard were the law, then every single
joint venture that charged anything for its product would be an antitrust 
violation because it would benefit consumer welfare even more if the joint 
venture offered its product for free.  And if that were the law, no one would 
propose joint ventures that benefit consumer welfare at all. 
























   
 





illustration,19 but there are others.  Critics have called for antitrust action 
against Google on a variety of other bases, including exclusive dealing, 
manipulating search results, and violating privacy.20  As one commentator 
representative of that view observes, “The question is why not force
Google to act more competitively?”21  After all, “[w]e don’t want to live
in a ‘winner take[s] all’ economy where a strong product allows a company
to pull up the ladder behind it and destroy its competitors.”22  A similar
view may underlie the respective actions of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and European Commission against Intel for the chip manufacturer’s 
use of exclusive-sales rebates.23  It is equally true of antitrust challenges
to Apple’s exclusive-dealing practices over its iPhone product’s voice 
and data services.24 
This construction of antitrust law—that dominant companies must
affirmatively support their fringe rivals’ ability to compete effectively— 
adopts a perspective of antitrust that is regulatory in nature.  It relies on
the premise that practices accompanying a dominant firm’s innovation,
which unequivocally results in continuous growth in consumer welfare, 
are objectionable because an LRA would benefit consumers even more.
The prudence of this premise depends intimately on the capacity for and 
cost of judicial error in ascertaining the economic effect of the allegedly
exclusionary behavior.  The risk and magnitude of error, however, are at 
their peak in the context of unilateral dominant-firm behavior, which 
suggests that judicial restraint would be appropriate.  Yet, if one adopts 
the increasingly prevalent view that antitrust must facilitate unfettered
access to markets, thus spurring free entry and expansion by incumbent
rivals, the Sherman Act goes from being a prophylactic device aimed at 
protecting consumers against welfare-reducing acts to being a misplaced
regulatory tool that potentially sacrifices both consumer welfare and 
efficiency in a misguided pursuit of more of both.
19. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
20. See, e.g., Larry Dignan, Google in the Antitrust Crosshairs, CBS NEWS (June 
23, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-205_162-20073700.html; Juliana
Gruenwald, Critics Cheer Possible Google Antitrust Probe, NAT’L J. TECH DAILY DOSE
(June 23, 2011, 4:47 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2011/06/critics-cheer-
possible-google.php. 
21. Nathan Newman, The Case for Antitrust Action Against Google, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 14, 2011, 7:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/the-case-
for-antitrust-ac_b_835675.html. 
22. Id. 
23. See Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding Under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-
3/37.990—Intel) 269, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/
37990/37990_3581_11.pdf. 
24. See In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05152 JW, 2010 WL

























   
 
  
[VOL. 49:  823, 2012] Antitrust as Regulation 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
This Article explores the emergence of the LRA test, as well as its 
dangers, and explains how an equivalent norm underlies recent 
monopolization cases.  The Author concludes that the law should not
require business practices to maximize social welfare to pass muster
under the antitrust laws.  As tools of public policy directed at unilateral 
market behavior, antitrust and regulation have long played distinct, though 
complementary, roles.  Natural-monopoly regulation has as its immodest 
goal the maximization of consumer welfare by simultaneously imposing 
universal service obligations and spurring the efficiencies associated
with competition through the imposition of various behavioral constraints.
That such regulation has widely been seen as ineffectual should in itself
suggest that antitrust needs a distinct focus.  Enforcement actions directed at 
welfare-enhancing practices improperly conflate antitrust and regulation.
The consumer is likely to be the ultimate victim.
II. COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST 
A.  What Does Antitrust Require? 
This Article argues that antitrust jurisprudence has adopted a broader-
than-desirable mandate.  To develop this thesis, however, it is first
necessary to define the purpose of antitrust enforcement.  This is because 
it would be impossible to articulate a defensible prescription without
identifying a metric by which to inform normative conclusions. 
In its purest sense, antitrust exists to keep the economy free of
artificial restraints that would frustrate competition.25  The process of 
competition, in turn, promises to yield a variety of overriding social
benefits.26  Market pressures lead rival manufacturers, distributors, retailers,
and technological innovators to focus their efforts on increasing quality
and decreasing price to attract sales from their rivals.27  This economic 
process is not a zero-sum game in which price-cutting companies simply
cede more wealth to consumers.28  Instead, the effect of competition in 
25. See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” 
Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 181 (2007). 
26. See, e.g., Lawrence L.C. Lee, Taiwan’s Antitrust Statutes: Proposals for a
Regulatory Regime and Comparison of U.S. and Taiwanese Antitrust Law, 6 IND. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 583, 586 (1996). 
27. See id. 
28. See Winton E. Williams, Resolving the Creditor’s Dilemma: An Elementary
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Causes and Cures of Counterproductive Practices in the











   
 












     
  
    
   
   
 




driving price toward marginal cost enhances both allocative and
productive efficiency, thus increasing the amount of consumption and 
hence wealth in society.29  Economies subject to high levels of competition
are characterized by relatively high levels of output, innovation, and 
employment, as well as reduced inflation.30 
Although society historically viewed competition as promoting ideals 
of distributive justice, this view has given way to a goal founded on 
economic efficiency.31  Thus, although some peripheral uncertainty
remains,32 most agree that since the 1970s, antitrust law has served to 
protect “consumer welfare,” which the law defines by reference to price 
theory as the difference between the aggregation of consumers’ individual 
reservation prices and the prices that they ultimately pay.33  A common 
refrain is that competition law protects consumers rather than competitors.34 
It is widely recognized, however, that economists’ model of perfect 
competition seldom encapsulates real-world markets, which are subject 
to a variety of structural and artificial impediments to competition.35 
the winnings of one player are the losses of another, so that the algebraic sum of the 
payoffs to each player always equals zero.”).
29. See John Han, Comment, Antitrust and Sharing Information About Product 
Quality, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 997–98 (2006). 
30. See, e.g., Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti, Product Market Competition, Job 
Security, and Aggregate Employment, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 667, 667–68 (2004)
(U.K.); Marcin Przybyla & Moreno Roma, Does Product Market Competition Reduce 
Inflation? Evidence from EU Countries and Sectors 4–6 (Eur. Cent. Bank Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 453, 2005), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/ 
scpwps/ecbwp453.pdf. 
31. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 passim (1982). 
32. See Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 59 (2010). 
33. See George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of the Antitrust Paradox, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 456 (2008). 
34. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986) 
(“[T]he antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors.” 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 488 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Many commentators, including
this Author, however, consider that this fundamental principle of antitrust is also the one 
that competition enforcement agencies and courts are most prone to violate. Furthermore,
some scholars have argued that antitrust should abandon the distinction between protecting
competition—in other words, consumers—and competitors in new-economy markets.
See, e.g., Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 151, 195 (2004). 
35. See, e.g., Ignacio De León, Latin American Competition Policy: From Nirvana 
Antitrust Policy to Reality-Based Institutional Competition Building, 83 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 39, 62 (2008).  But cf. RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: 
CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 165 (2d ed. 1981) (“The economic 
model of perfect competition was never intended as a policy prescription, and it is a 
basic, though extremely common, error to suppose that markets do not work efficiently if 
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Constraints of the former type include natural-monopoly conditions 
associated with high ratios of fixed to marginal costs, which often
accompany strong network effects.36  Policymakers either nationalize 
such industries—as was prevalent in Europe from the 1950s through the 
1970s37—or, in the case of the United States, grant a private company a
certificate of public convenience and necessity, forbid entry or exit, impose 
quality- and scale-of-service requirements, and regulate pricing.38  Antitrust
has a limited purview in so-called regulated industries because it can do 
nothing to alter their structural characteristics.
Industries that can efficiently sustain high levels of competition, 
however, may nevertheless be corrupted by the actions of those entities 
that operate within them.  Private agreements to eliminate price and quality 
competition, whether through cartel activity or merger to monopoly,
can undo the benefits of competition, and thus impose costs on society 
that go beyond wealth transfers from consumers to sellers.39  Antitrust
operates as a safeguard against such artificial—as distinct from structural— 
hindrances to competition.  It does so by policing concerted and unilateral
actions by market actors, both producers and consumers, ensuring that 
they do not corrupt free-market processes.40 
A tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the law enforces antitrust rules
to promote consumer welfare, economically defined.  Two qualifications, 
however, are necessary.  First, allocative efficiency may trump consumer
surplus.41  A tension between these two measures of welfare arises when 
a restraint simultaneously enhances output and transfers wealth from 
consumers to the seller side of the market.42  As economists’ primary 
objection to monopoly is the deadweight loss associated with pricing
36. See United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1122 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
37. See, e.g., Bob Bell, Broadband Deregulation—Similar Legislation, Different 
Results: A Comparative Look at the United States and the European Union, 10 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 77, 80 (2007). 
38. See Alexander C. Larson, Reforming Telecommunications Policy in Response
to Entry into Local Exchange Markets, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 14 (1995). 
39. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Implications of “Going Private” and 
Other Changes of Corporate Control, 49 B.C. L. REV. 971, 976 (2008). 
40. See Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the 
Construction of Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 887 (2007). 
41. The Author uses “consumer welfare” and “consumer surplus” interchangeably. 
42. The best example involves first-degree price discrimination, which results in
allocative efficiency and zero consumer welfare. See, e.g., Douglas M. Kochelek, Data




   
  
 










   
  
   








    
  
above marginal cost, conduct that increases output may be efficient and 
therefore desirable, even if it diminishes consumer surplus. 
Second, a narrow definition of consumer welfare may be misleading 
in some circumstances.  “Static efficiency” encapsulates the desirable
conditions associated with perfect competition, describing the absence of 
deadweight loss where price equals marginal cost.43  Static efficiency, 
which is tied to the concept of consumer surplus, is the relevant lodestar 
for antitrust analysis, however, only when technological progress is
absent.44  Yet, dynamic efficiency is a key determinant of social welfare.45 
Studies have linked technological innovation to three-quarters of the 
U.S. economy’s post-World War II growth.46  As scientific progress and 
commercialization of new technologies bring about dramatic increases in
consumer welfare, most consider dynamic efficiency—the realization of 
optimal rates of innovation—to be more important than static efficiency.47 
In this respect, the relationship between competition and innovation is 
complex.48  Although the weight of the evidence suggests that there is
usually a positive correlation between the two phenomena,49 in some 
important circumstances—or, perhaps more accurately, within certain
parameters—they may be negatively correlated.50  Optimal innovation
policy requires careful calibration of various determinants of research
43. See Thomas O. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation, 
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2008); see also Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Competition Policy at the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 585, 589 (2001) (describing static efficiency as the optimum utilization of
resources). 
44. See Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Innovation-Centric Approach of 
Telecommunications Infrastructure Regulation, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 221, 240–41 (2011), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol16/issue2/v16i2_221-Stylianou.pdf. 
45. See Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
745, 775 (2011) (“A proper policy should balance both static efficiency . . . and dynamic 
efficiency.”). 
46. See ARTI RAI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING 
INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 1–2
(2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/migrated/Patent
Reform-paper.pdf. 
47. See Barnett, supra note 43 passim. 
48. See Gregory J. Werden, Should the Agencies Issue New Merger Guidelines?: 
Learning from Experience, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 839, 847 n.59 (2009). 
49. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust 
Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 583–86 (2007); Christopher R. Leslie, 
Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 
1265 (2009); see also Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 17–19 (2007) (discussing competition’s positive effect on innovation). 
50. See, e.g., Kevin Arquit, Keynote Address at the 2009 Cornell International 
Law Journal Symposium (Feb. 27, 2009), in 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 17 (2010) (“The 
Chicago School instructs that monopoly profits actually spur innovation, a conclusion 
that the Supreme Court echoed as recently as two days ago.” (citing Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
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and development (R&D) and commercialization.  In some situations,
cabined monopoly—such as intellectual property (IP) rights—can efficiently
spur competition to acquire the same.51  This may ultimately be beneficial
to society, but any kind of exclusivity, including that created by the IP
system, comes at the expense of static efficiency and hence a cabined 
measure of consumer welfare.52  In this way, tensions may emerge between
the promotion of static and dynamic efficiency, creating difficult issues for
antitrust enforcement.53 
It thus follows that, although consumer welfare is a rather nuanced 
concept, a consensus has emerged that this is the relevant metric underlying 
antitrust enforcement. 
B.  Guardian or Aggressor?: Antitrust’s Mandate in Practice 
A crucial ensuing question concerns the manner in which competition 
law purports to achieve its goal of protecting consumers.  To understand
antitrust, one must appreciate that it furthers consumer welfare only in a 
passive way.  It does not operate as a regulatory system that dictates
maximum prices, terms of service to clients, or obligatory actions on the
part of even dominant firms.54  Instead, the definitive characteristic of
the Sherman Act is passivity.55  The law does not instruct companies to 
act in a particular way ex ante; it merely imposes narrow limits—often
defined ex post—on commercial actors’ right to conduct their affairs in a 
manner that proves injurious to consumers.56 
51. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 247, 250–51 (1994). 
52. See Norman Siebrasse, The Structure of the Law of Patentable Subject Mater, 
23 INTELL. PROP. J. 169, 178 (2011). 
53. See infra Part III.B. 
54. See Linkline, 555 U.S. at 452 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)). 
55. Cf. Nathan B. Grzegorek, Comment, The Price of Admission: How Inconsistent 
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws in America’s Live Entertainment Sector Hurts the Average 
Consumer, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 261, 269 (2010) (“The passive nature of antitrust 
enforcement in recent history can attributed to the . . . ‘Chicago School.’” (citing Mike J. 
Mandel & Mike France, The Great Antitrust Debate: Focus on Innovation? Or Stick to 
Pricing Issues? The Outcome Is Critical, BUS. WEEK, June 26, 2000, available at http:// 
www.businessweek.com/2000/00_26/b3687080.htm)). 
56. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (“There
is a difference between positive and negative duties, and the antitrust laws . . . have





    
   









   
 
     
 
 




So, for instance, the law prohibits horizontal competitors from entering 
into naked agreements not to compete on price or in particular geographic
regions.57  Similarly, two or more such companies cannot merge with 
one another either to form a monopoly or to effect an increase in 
concentration sufficient to facilitate tacit collusion.58 Rivals may not
share sensitive pricing and sales volume information, which would
facilitate parallel pricing behavior.59 Monopolists cannot engage in
practices that are capable of excluding equally or more efficient rivals;60 
no company can agree with another to boycott a rival.61 
If antitrust imposes a variety of limits on commercial behavior, the 
law is at least as notable for what it does not require.  Antitrust does not 
condemn an absence of competition in a market, and thus does not 
require rivals to engage in price-cutting or other socially desirable 
behavior.62  Competitors can lawfully engage in cartel-like behavior as 
long as they do so in parallel fashion, independent of any direct 
communication or facilitative practices.63  The law does not condemn a 
monopolist for charging monopoly prices,64 nor does it speak to the
propriety of terms that a dominant company imposes on its customers or
of the quality of service that the monopolist ultimately provides, which
are goals that regulation better serves.65  Thus, although antitrust promotes
the interests of consumers, it does so only in a reactionary and limited 
manner.  The law does not compel particular behavior but instead allows 
companies to operate freely within a large spectrum of commercial
57. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395–98 (1927); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
24 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. 
58. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 20–27. 
59. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 334–35, 337 
(1969). 
60. See generally Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the 
Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 743 (2005) (discussing the law governing exclusionary practices
by dominant firms). 
61. See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1959). 
62. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly pricing, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the 
free-market system.”). 
63. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
227 (1993). 
64. Id.  EU competition law is distinct from U.S. antitrust law in this respect, as
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union purports to forbid
the imposition by a dominant undertaking of unfair purchase or selling prices. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 89.  Neither the European Commission nor the 
courts, however, have ever applied this provision. 
65. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That 
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conduct that does not bear an unacceptable propensity to interfere with
free-market processes.66 
This discussion, however, leaves an important question unanswered. 
Specifically, when circumstances call on antitrust to judge the propriety 
of a particular act, how does consumer well-being align with the legality
condition?  Of course, an act is surely improper if it injures consumers’ 
long-term welfare, discounted to present value.  What if the act, however, 
modestly benefits them? Does such a showing translate into a conclusive
finding of legality?  What if a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant
company had a variety of substitutable paths available to it, all of which
had positive effects of varying magnitude on consumer welfare?  If the 
defendant adopted a course that produced the least benefit to consumers,
should an antitrust violation follow? Should the Sherman Act require 
the most beneficial path? 
In the Author’s view, when courts analyze a challenged restraint to 
determine its status under the Sherman Act, they should not ascertain
whether the practice is efficiency maximizing.  They should determine 
only whether the impugned conduct is, in fact, efficient—welfare 
increasing.  The law should recognize exceptions to this rule only if both the
risk and cost of error in the case at hand are unusually low.  In all other 
cases, the questions whether an act is efficient and legal should be
completely synonymous.  Interestingly, this would seem to be precisely 
what the Supreme Court instructed in its early jurisprudence.67 
Outside the narrow purview of per se illegal behavior—horizontal
price-fixing and market-sharing agreements, as well as certain
boycotts—antitrust’s principal mode of analysis is the rule of reason.68 
According to the Supreme Court, this form of inquiry asks only whether 
an objected-to practice suppresses or promotes welfare.69  It does not  
make legality contingent on the extent by which the restraint exceeds the 
threshold of minimal efficiency.70  As expressed by the Court, “[t]he true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed . . . promotes competition 
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”71 
66. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512–13 (7th Cir. 1982). 
67. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
68. See Vincent Chiappetta, Living with Patents: Insights from Patent Misuse, 15 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2011). 
69. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
70. Id. 


















   
    
   
Thus, if an objected-to practice promotes competition, it should pass 
muster under the Sherman Act regardless of whether a modified form of
the conduct would have an even better effect. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have not been faithful to
the Supreme Court’s seminal pronouncement.  Each of them has adopted 
an LRA inquiry in analyzing the legality of an allegedly anticompetitive 
practice.72  Furthermore, there is little uniformity among the circuits
because they have adopted conflicting interpretations of the LRA rule.73 
The D.C. Circuit requires that an antitrust defendant prove that its 
impugned conduct represents the “least restrictive means of achieving 
the desired goal.”74  This feature of the court’s holding is invariant to
whether the challenged restraint is conducive of efficiency or otherwise 
desirable to consumers.75  The Seventh Circuit has paid homage to the
LRA rule in circumstances requiring “a more flexible approach than the
traditional rule of reason inquiry,” instructing that should a plaintiff meet 
its burden of persuasion by showing that challenged conduct “restricted
competition rather than promoting it, the burden of persuasion would
shift to the defendants to show,” amongst other things, that the goal of 
the conduct “could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less 
restrictive of competition.”76 
The Second and Fourth Circuits apply essentially the same test, but
place the burden on the plaintiff to establish that an LRA existed.77  Less 
harshly, the Third and Eleventh Circuits require plaintiffs to prove that 
the challenged conduct was not “reasonably necessary” to accomplish
the desired goal, under which standard one need not make a showing of
welfare maximization.78  The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits propound 
the least draconian interpretation of the LRA rule, obligating plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the defendant could have achieved the benefit of the
72. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry 
in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 581–86 (2009). 
73. See generally id. (providing a detailed discussion of the various approaches to
the LRA rule adopted by the U.S. Courts of Appeals).
74. Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
75. Id. at 1494–95. 
76. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 362–63 (7th Cir. 1990). 
77. See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104 
(2d Cir. 2010); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 510–11 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
78. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005); Am.
Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248–49 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting 
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assailed restraint in a “substantially less restrictive manner.”79  The First
and Fifth Circuits also recognize the LRA rule, but have not indicated 
where the burden of proof lies.80 
How does the rule operate in practice?  It finds literal application only
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.81  Under this provision, courts
analyze agreements to determine their impact on competition.  Contracts 
are, of course, indispensable to economic efficiency and ubiquitous for
that reason.  Few agreements raise competitive concerns.  An important
exception concerns arrangements between horizontal competitors, though 
these too can often be efficient.82  Concerted practices between rivals are 
rife with competitive dangers—some of them subtle—as competitors 
have every incentive to collude.83 Antitrust thus operates as a significant
exception to the principle of freedom of contract that otherwise defines a
free-market economy.84  Yet the law’s prohibition on concerted behavior
between rivals is not absolute.  Many cases arise in which restrictions on 
competition between direct competitors beget larger social gains.  A classic
example involves a partnership or company.85  In a world where no
interrival agreements are permissible, every industry would be comprised
79. See Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1012 
(6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers 
Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003)); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Ne.-Nw., 
4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 
1413 (9th Cir. 1991)); Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413. 
80. See Feldman, supra note 72, at 585 n.118 (citing Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 
1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994); and Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 
945 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
81. But cf. Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule
of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
435, 437 (2006) (arguing that “[a]lthough courts usually describe the rule of reason as a 
particular step-wise test for assessing the legality of concerted action, the rule of reason 
more generally provides a principle for generating antitrust liability tests in a common-
law fashion” and concluding that section 2 jurisprudence incorporates a rule-of-reason 
test (emphasis omitted)).
82. See Fred S. McChesney, Easterbrook on Errors, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
11, 17–18 (2010). 
83. See James Langenfeld & Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of U.S. Federal 
Antitrust Enforcement: Learning from Past and Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 
1, 8 (2007). 
84. See Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting 
Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 132
n.183 (2006). 









   














   
  
 
exclusively of sole traders.86  Allowing competitors to agree not to 
compete for the purpose of creating a company, partnership, or other 
commercial collective allows the ensuing entities to achieve a far greater
level of efficiency than individuals could achieve alone.  Cognizant of this
economic fact, antitrust permits restrictions on competition where necessary
to achieve larger gains. 
C.  The LRA Rule’s Insidious Corruption of Antitrust Jurisprudence 
In light of the preceding discussion, it is clear that the LRA test is an 
established element of antitrust analysis under the rule of reason.  This 
observation raises at least three questions.  First, what are the dangers of 
the law’s requirement that companies shape their agreements in a way to 
achieve more than a creditable gain in consumer welfare?  Second, are
these risks localized—are they limited to cases of concerted behavior— 
or do they threaten broader forms of commercial conduct?  Third, have 
the theoretical dangers of requiring welfare maximization been realized?
As explained above, the LRA inquiry—though well-intentioned—is 
imprudent.  Its error is one of both apprehension and practical consequence. 
In the former respect, requiring parties to fine-tune their contractual
arrangements to maximize welfare is an object of regulation, rather than
competition law.87  Furthermore, it may not be feasible to cabin an LRA-
based conception of antitrust to simple cases in which companies can
reliably demarcate permissible forms of conduct ex ante.  More complex
cases invite mistaken determinations about the nature of the but-for 
world in which courts determine that particular defendants would have 
entered into superior arrangements.88 
Importantly, and as Part IV explains, the LRA rule is not unique to 
cases of concerted behavior.  It has transcended the rule of reason— 
86. One modern industry that is composed entirely of individuals is the barrister 
profession in Ireland.  For the Author’s discussion of this particular feature of the 
industry, see Alan Devlin, Questioning the Sole-Trader Rule in the Barrister Profession, 
44 IRISH JURIST 123 (2010) (Ir.). 
87. Cf. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory 
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 695 n.52 (2009) (“Of course, antitrust and regulation take 
different approaches to achieving their common goal, but both ultimately aim to
maximize efficiency in markets.”); Mark D. Whitener, Editor’s Note, Change.gov, 
ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 4 (“New Deputy AAG for Economics Carl Shapiro 
recently noted that while some describe antitrust as a form of ‘government regulation,’
antitrust ‘is a fundamentally different exercise’ . . . .”).
88. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A New Approach to the Antitrust Analysis of 
Mergers, 83 B.U. L. REV. 785, 798 (2003) (opining that the requirement that defendants
prove that efficiencies are merger specific “allows judges, juries, and antitrust regulators 
to second-guess defendants’ business judgment and substitute speculation on
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pursuant to which it explicitly applies—and has percolated throughout 
antitrust law to corrupt judicial and agency understanding of optimal
competition policy more generally.89  The danger is most pronounced,
the Article submits, with respect to innovation-induced dominance.  This 
is the field in which both judicial capacity to err and the social cost of
the same are greatest.90  As a result, it is in this setting that a focus on 
welfare maximization is most harmful.  Part III addresses the relationship 
between antitrust and innovation, exploring the difficult questions of 
public policy that underlie the same.91  This discussion reveals why 
monopolization cases in innovation markets are uniquely susceptible to
erroneous judicial fact-finding.  Part IV applies this discussion to recent
enforcement actions, explaining that the LRA rule’s subtle transmogrification
in the field of dominant-firm conduct bears unique dangers that are only
now becoming clear. 
III. ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND WELFARE MAXIMIZATION 
This Article explains that antitrust has adopted a well-intentioned but
ultimately destructive prescription aimed at engineering welfare-
maximizing outcomes.  This Part observes that the economic literature 
addressing the relationship between innovation policy and antitrust
oversight of dominant-firm behavior is indeterminate.  As a result, courts 
are uniquely susceptible to err in determining whether an alleged act of
predatory exclusion realizes a net gain or loss for consumers.  Part III.B 
explains that moving the goal line beyond a showing of a net increase in
89. This migration is, for reasons explained below, unwelcome, but nonetheless
unsurprising, for the nature of antitrust analysis is substantially similar under sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act, which address concerted and unilateral behavior, respectively.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is clear that 
the analysis under section 2 is similar to that under section 1 regardless whether the rule 
of reason label is applied . . . .” (quoting Mid-Texas Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 615
F.2d 1372, 1389 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980))). 
90. See, e.g., David L. Meyer, Section 2 Standards and Consumer Welfare: Some 
Lessons from the World of Merger Enforcement, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371, 409 
(“In the Section 2 setting, there is much greater ambiguity: often the short run effects and 
long run effects will diverge, and even if adverse price or quantity effects are expected, it 
is much harder to judge whether they were caused by ‘bad’ behavior or good.  Hinging 
the Section 2 outcome solely on an inquiry about net consumer welfare effects might end 
up begging a whole series of other, harder questions.”). 
91. For a representative discussion of some of the policy issues arising at the
intersection of innovation policy and antitrust, see J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, 















   
 
        
  
 
        
   
   
    
  




    
  
    
welfare narrows the permissible range of desirable behavior, thus gravely 
compounding the courts’ proclivity to commit Type I errors.92  The cost 
of false positives, moreover, is especially grave in technology markets, 
given the inestimable social benefits of innovation.93 
To be sure, economic theory and empirical investigation have yielded 
a variety of useful normative conclusions concerning innovation and the 
market conditions that best foster it.  Certain features of an effective
innovation platform are clear.  These include high levels of education,94 
stable legal systems that enforce contractual and other rights,95 favorable 
bankruptcy laws that permit risky but socially desirable entrepreneurial
endeavors and enable people with ideas to pursue further projects if their 
initial ventures fail,96 employment laws that facilitate the creation and 
efficient movement of human capital,97 efficient capital markets that 
produce venture capital for worthy projects,98 a proper tax policy,99 an 
appropriate level of public-sector spending that does not crowd out private 
investment,100 consumer protection laws that ensure the dissemination of 
accurate information into the marketplace,101 and immigration laws that
allow companies to hire foreigners with specialized training where domestic 
92. For an explanation of Type I and Type II errors, see infra note 244 and 
accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2257 passim (2010). 
94. See, e.g., Andrew Jaynes, Why Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Remains 
Entrenched in the Philippines, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 55, 107 (2009). 
95. See, e.g., Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial 
Activism?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 687 (1993). 
96. See Daniel H. Cole, Climate Change, Adaptation, and Development, 26 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2008) (citing DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 80–82 (1990)). 
97. For instance, some have attributed Silicon Valley’s considerable success to 
California’s refusal to recognize noncompete agreements.  See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara,
Covenants Not To Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from
Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection from Employee Mobility Against Legal 
Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 307–08 
(2006). This aspect of California law means that employers in need of highly skilled
employees can readily acquire them by offering superior compensation packages. See id.
98. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and the Information 
Age, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 2–3 (2011). 
99. See, e.g., Matthew A. Melone, The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently 
Unnecessary Development, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 437, 439 n.5 (2007) (citing I.R.C.
§§ 41, 45(c), 174 (2006)). 
100. See, e.g., Evan N. Turgeon, Triple-Dividends: Toward Pigovian Gasoline 
Taxation, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 145, 168 (2010). 
101. See, e.g., Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer 
Protection: At Odds with Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV. 131, 133 
n.15 (2006) (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: 
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labor supply proves inadequate.102  Beyond these factors, intellectual
property and antitrust laws play a crucial economic role in spurring
innovation.103  Unfortunately, the specific antitrust policies that best
promote technological advancement are far from clear.104 
At its most fundamental, the proper relationship between innovation 
and antitrust depends on the question whether conditions of monopoly or 
competition are most likely to spur desirable rates of R&D.105  After  
briefly exploring the literature that has addressed this question—and
observing that no clear principle of general application has emerged— 
this Part explores recent calls that antitrust affirmatively require the best.
The Author opines that the commentators making such demands do so 
because they are hostile to concentrated industry structures.  Unfortunately, 
competitive high-technology markets can display just such traits. 
A.  The Schumpeter-Arrow Debate 
Perhaps the single most famous debate in antitrust concerns the
question whether competitive or concentrated industries are superior
incubators of innovation.106  In the latter direction, Joseph Schumpeter
argued that monopoly is the best driver of invention because the large 
profits associated with above-marginal-cost pricing produce surplus 
102. See, e.g., Competitiveness and Innovation on the Committee’s 50th
Anniversary with Bill Gates, Chairman of Microsoft: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Sci. & Tech., 110th Cong. 18–20 (2008) (statement of William H. Gates, Chairman, 
Microsoft; Co-Chair, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation); Kim Hart, Gates Calls on 
Congress for Science Education, Visas, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at D3. 
103. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 
(1989); Weiser, supra note 98, at 13; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1–3 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
hearings/ip/222655.pdf. 
104. The ultimate issue, from an antitrust perspective, is whether competition rules 
can force innovation-based monopolists to operate in a manner less injurious to rivals 
and hence more beneficial to consumers.  This basic question dovetails with the debate 
as to whether the LRA inquiry underlying the rule of reason is well-founded. 
105. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. 
J.L. & TRADE AMS. 237 passim (2007). 
106. Compare, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic
Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 569, 570 (1994) (discussing the positive effects of competition on innovation), with
WILLIAM L. BALDWIN & JOHN T. SCOTT, MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE




















    
 
    
  
 







funds for research and development.107  Furthermore, he maintained,
dominant companies have incentives to invest private capital because
their installed client base and scale efficiencies lessen the chance that
fringe rivals can appropriate the value of any successful inventions.108 
According to Schumpeter, highly competitive markets that involve low 
profit margins are not apt to foster high levels of innovation.109  Thus,  
monopoly may provide a “more stable platform” for R&D investment.110 
Broadly speaking, the Schumpeterian view counsels a laissez-faire
approach to antitrust policy with respect to dominant-firm unilateral
behavior.111  If competition rules force monopolists to license their physical
and intellectual infrastructure, or otherwise create conditions that are 
inimical to high concentration and conducive to entry and rival expansion, 
the result may be lower prices and higher output, but reduced rates of
innovation. Assuming that policymakers wish to promote dynamic over 
static innovation,112 interventionist antitrust policy aimed at fostering 
competition in monopolized markets may have undesirable results. 
Kenneth Arrow rejected the view that monopoly is most conducive to 
R&D and argued that competition best spurs innovation.113  He explained 
that dominant firms have relatively weak incentives to research 
groundbreaking technologies because they face a high opportunity cost 
in doing so.114  More specifically, because monopolists earn monopoly 
profits on the basis of then-existing technology, their spending significant 
amounts of those profits to realize a new marketable technology may
simply displace one profit base for another.115  This phenomenon is known
as the “replacement effect,” which renders an invention less profitable 
than it would otherwise be.116 
By contrast, a company subject to competition has more to gain by
achieving a breakthrough discovery because it will experience a significant
107. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 87– 
106 (1st ed. 1942). 
108. Id. at 96. 
109. Id.
 110. Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-
Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 160 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al., eds., 2006) (citing SCHUMPETER, supra note 107). 
111. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217, 
1278. 
112. The economic literature makes increasingly clear that dynamic efficiency is 
indeed more important. See, e.g., Sidak & Teece, supra note 91, at 582–85. 
113. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609 (1962). 
114. Id. at 622. 
115. Id.
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increase in demand, thus taking profitable sales opportunities from its 
rivals.117  Arrow showed that for a drastic innovation—one for which the
monopoly price is lower than the previous technology’s marginal cost— 
the reward from developing a novel process is the same for both a
monopolist and a previously competitive firm, but that the monopolist 
faces a larger replacement effect.118  Thus, the firm subject to competition 
faces a stronger incentive to invent.119 
The Schumpeter-Arrow debate has generated a considerable body of 
empirical and theoretic work but few determinative answers.120  Arrow’s
model concerned innovation in technological methods, which are apt to
diminish a company’s marginal costs.121  The model did not address 
product innovations, which arguably represent a sphere of invention that 
is more important to the economy.  As an improvement product is less 
likely to render an old product defunct, however, a monopolist’s invention 
of the former may allow it to price discriminate and hence achieve greater 
profitability.  As a result, and although a competitive firm’s replacement 
cost is likely to be less, a monopolist may have a greater incentive to 
invent a novel product.122  Even if a product invention is sufficiently
revolutionary as to constitute a drastic invention, as per Arrow’s definition,
a competitive firm will not necessarily have the greater incentive to 
invent unless the discovery is so significant that the monopolist cannot
use it for price discrimination purposes.123 
An authoritative 2006 synopsis of the economic literature concluded 
that the evidence “does not support a conclusion that large firms promote
innovation because they provide large and stable cash flows, economies 
of scale (above some threshold), or risk diversification. . . .  At the same 
 117. Arrow, supra note 113, at 620. 
118. Id. at 621. 
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow 
Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 396 (2008)
(“One of the most heated discussions in economic circles in recent years has concerned 
the relationship between market structure and innovation.  After a half-century of debate 
and innumerable studies, the overwhelming consensus is that there is no clear answer to
the question.  The diametrically opposed positions of Joseph Schumpeter (favoring
concentration) and Kenneth Arrow (favoring competition) both garner support in unending 
bouts of hand-wringing.”). 
121. See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 106, at 575 n.22. 
122. See Shane Greenstein & Garey Ramey, Market Structure, Innovation, and 
Vertical Product Differentiation, 16 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 285, 294 (1997). 
















   
   
   
   
   
 
 
      
 
   












time, neither theory nor empirical evidence supports a strong conclusion
that competition is uniformly a stimulus to innovation.”124  It thus  
follows that economic models do not lend themselves to an unqualified
policy prescription.125 
Complicating matters further is the question of how to best interpret 
Arrow and Schumpeterian views from an antitrust perspective.  In the
first place, it may be a mistake to overemphasize the practical importance of
the replacement effect.  This phenomenon is apt to be serious only where 
a dominant company actually enjoys a secure position that fringe rivals
or other potential competitors do not threaten.126  In fact, monopoly
positions in technology markets are less secure than one might suppose, 
even in the presence of network effects.127 Thus, even dominant companies
need to continue innovating to maintain their positions.  Furthermore, 
the fact of monopoly is consistent with Arrow’s model, which relied on 
exclusive rights over one’s innovation.128  Enforcing open standards,
124. Id. at 205–06. 
125. Nevertheless, there is some support for the hypothesis that dominant companies
innovate differently than those in competitive markets, which may have some relevance 
to antitrust policy.  Monopolists, unconstrained by competitors, are more likely to innovate
in a steady, incremental manner, while technological companies subject to fierce competition 
are more apt to realize dramatic technological breakthroughs in a “lumpy” manner.
See Alexander E. Silverman, Intellectual Property Law and the Venture Capital Process, 5
HIGH TECH. L.J. 157, 169 (1990).  But see Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs,
and Intellectual Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1210–13 (2008) (exploring the 
economic theory and empirical evidence surrounding invention and innovation by small 
and large companies, finding them to be inconclusive).  In this respect, academics
sometimes use AT&T prior to its breakup on antitrust grounds as the quintessential
example against which to judge the innovation associated with small companies, such as 
start-ups in technology markets. See, e.g., Kristine Laudadio Devine, Preserving Competition
in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How Do You Solve a Problem Like Google?, 10 N.C. 
J.L. & TECH. 59, 104 n.187 (2008) (“Additional competition may not affect the investment in
R&D; companies like AT&T were widely known to have deep investments in innovations,
even though many of those innovations never made it to consumers.”); John E. Lopatka 
& William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, 
and Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 917 (2001); Richard A. Posner, The Decline
and Fall of AT&T: A Personal Recollection, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 11, 18 (2008) (“AT&T 
did a lot of innovation, but they wanted every new thing to be introduced gradually, they
wanted uniformity not variety, single not multiple products, and they didn’t want
customers buffeting them with demands.”); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A.  Lemley,  
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1619 (2003) (observing scholarly
commentary that contrasts the nonproprietary nature of the Internet that allowed
innovation to flourish in the 1990s with “AT&T, which had a monopoly in telephony . . . 
[and] did not engage in similar innovation”). 
126. See Devine, supra note 125, at 104. 
127. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 
930 (2000) (“Because of the extraordinary pace of innovation, . . . the extraordinary
amount of capital that is available worldwide for investment in new enterprises, and the 
rapidity with which new networks . . . can be put into service, the networks that have 
emerged in the new economy do not seem particularly secure against competition.”). 
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thus eschewing legal recognition of proprietary rights in information,
would lead to suboptimal innovation on account of insufficient incentives
to invent.129  In this respect, a policy that sought to maximize competition—
literally defined—would run directly counter to Arrow’s view.130  It  
would myopically substitute technological competition in R&D for price-
based competition. 
The relevant normative prescription is therefore more subtle.131  One 
advancing Arrow’s view of fostering innovation would respect intellectual 
property rights even if they produced monopoly conditions in some 
circumstances, but would presumably adopt a variety of policies aimed
at ensuring that the inventor obtaining such dominance would not use its 
position to quash actual or potential competition.  In this respect, an
inventor would not have the right to control follow-on paths of technological 
research, to use its dominant position to fetter rivals’ attempts to research 
and commercialize new generations of products, or otherwise to appropriate 
value that goes beyond the nature of the claimed invention itself.  In 
contrast, a Schumpeterian approach might be more willing to allow a 
dominant company to enjoy the fruits of that position because, one
subscribing to that view would argue, an absence of immediate competition 
over future avenues of R&D would not do violence to long-term
innovation.  Empirical and theoretical investigations of these alternative 
approaches, however, have failed to yield a robust policy prescription. 
As the dynamics of innovation are both complex and context specific, 
and because general principles are elusive,132 it is difficult to determine
whether a particular form of dominant-firm behavior enhances or depresses 
consumer welfare.  It is for this reason, in addition to the immeasurability of
129. As noted above, the heterogeneity of industrial innovation means that conditions
that are favorable to innovation in one setting may not be in others.  It is undoubtedly
true that nonproprietary standards may spur greater levels of desirable innovation than 
closed ones in certain circumstances.  The classic example involves the early history of
the Internet. See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND 
INNOVATION (2010) (providing an overview of how open standards led to rapid innovation
in the Internet context).
130. See Sidak & Teece, supra note 91, at 588 (“Arrow sets aside the appropriability
problem (that is, how to capture value from innovation) and posits a perfect property
right in the information underlying a specific production technique.”). 
131. See id. passim. 
132. See F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 
1011 (1987) (“Although there are fairly simple and well-accepted generalizations as to
which market structures stimulate the most rapid pace of innovation, the question of
what progress rate is socially optimal, and . . . which market structure driving it is best, is














   
 
 
   
 
  








long-term effects, that judicial decisionmaking in the section 2 context is 
highly error prone. 
B.  Controversy and Competition in the New Economy 
Critics have recently assailed the idea that antitrust should have a 
limited purview.133  Such commentators would presumably take umbrage at
this Author’s assertion that, other than in straightforward cases concerning
concerted behavior, antitrust has no business requiring that companies 
tailor their conduct to maximize consumer welfare.134 
Why would observers criticize this position when the economics 
concerning optimal industry structures for promoting innovation are 
indeterminate, and when courts have exceedingly limited ability to
gauge the welfare effects of a dominant-firm practice?  The answer, this 
Author submits, is because critics rely on political predispositions hostile 
to concentrated industry structure when analyzing uncertain market
phenomena.135  It is interesting to observe, then, that revolutionary
technological breakthroughs are likely to yield dominant positions. 
Technology markets have displayed a historical tendency to begin with 
rapid innovation based on open standards, to progress to increased
industry concentration and proprietary control, and from there, often to
conditions in which a single company achieves a dominant position.136 
There is, however, a tendency for competition-induced displacement of 
incumbent monopolists to occur.137  This reality sits uneasily with those
who are favorably predisposed to open technologies, interoperability,
low market concentration, and high degrees of price competition.138 
Although some such commentators might acknowledge that agreements 
or dominant-firm practices implicating new technologies inure to the 
benefit of consumers, they would argue that antitrust intervention focused 
133. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 21 (asserting Google’s lack of competition
could result in decreased pressures to make better products); Editorial, Did the Microsoft
Case Change the World?, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK 7 (“The European
Commission is deciding whether Google abused its search dominance, and American 
authorities are considering an investigation.  We support these efforts.  Innovation needs 
competition.”); Editorial, Google’s Book Deal: A Universal Library Is a Great Idea, but 
Not if the Price Is a Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at A26.
134. But cf. Kochelek, supra note 42, at 529 (describing the view that antitrust 
should concern itself with maximizing consumer welfare). 
135. For the Author’s broader discussion of this phenomenon, see Alan Devlin & 
Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
253 (2010). 
136. See generally  TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010) (describing how innovative technologies that encourage 
general use generally fall into the hands of concentrated, dominant companies).
137. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 127, at 929–30. 
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on facilitating greater levels of competition would advantage consumers 
even more. 
Recent examples of overwhelming commercial success based on 
innovation abound.  Facebook and Google provide good examples,
though of course, few technology companies have achieved such dramatic
gains as Apple, which over the last two years has overtaken the operating 
system giant, Microsoft, in terms of stock market value, revenue, and 
profitability with a series of profound innovations.139  Perhaps the clearest 
recent example of innovation-yielding monopoly is the Google Books 
Search (GBS) project, which the Author explores in the next Part.140 
In all of these cases, critics have called on antitrust to restore
competition and to deny dominant companies control over the markets in
which they operate.  No one protests more vituperatively than successful
innovators’ competitors.141 Apple’s rivals condemned the company’s 
139. See, e.g., Miguel Helft & Ashlee Vance, Apple Is No. 1 in Tech, Overtaking
Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2010, at B1.  Apple’s notable market-changing products 
include its iTunes program, which solved the vexing dilemma of designing a product that 
would be commercially viable in light of wholesale piracy in the online distribution of
music and video, its wildly popular iPhone and iPad products, and its Mac computers. 
All of these innovations have bestowed Apple with considerable market power, which 
has in turn invited a series of antitrust actions. See Matt McMurrer, Note, Exclusive 
Gadget: Apple & AT&T Antitrust Litigation and the iPhone Aftermarkets, 36 J. CORP. L.
495, 496 (2011); Thomas Catan & Nathan Koppel, Regulators Eye Apple Anew: 
Enforcers Interested in Whether Digital-Subscription Rules Stifle Competition, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 18, 2011, at B1; Josh Kosman, An Antitrust App: Apple May Be in the Eye of
Regulatory Storm, N.Y. POST, May 3, 2010, at 31, available at 2010 WLNR 9151101;
Jeffrey Shinder & Ankur Kapoor, Will Apple iCloud Bring an Antitrust Litigation
Storm?, FORBES (June 20, 2011, 5:14 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/ciocentral/2011/
06/10/will-apple-icloud-bring-an-antitrust-litigation-storm/. 
140. As explained below, the Internet search giant risked massive copyright 
infringement, developed and utilized groundbreaking scanning technology, and spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars attempting to make digital copies of every book in the 
world.  See infra Part IV.A.1.  When Google sought to settle an ensuing copyright class 
action on terms that would grant the company control over in-copyright works whose
authors could not be found—orphan works—and rights over other copyright-protected 
books whose authors did not opt out, a firestorm of protest resulted.  See infra Part
IV.A.2.  Much of the condemnation emanated from the perceived fact that Google, but
none of its competitors, would have access to the scanned universe of books, thus 
providing the company with a secure dominant position. See infra Part IV.A.2.  Other 
important examples include Google’s Internet search algorithm and Intel’s sales practices
with respect to cutting-edge computer chips. See infra text accompanying notes 259–64. 
141. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Antitrust Cry from Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
2011, at B1; Gabriele Steinhauser & Michael Liedtke, Microsoft Skewers Google in EU



























   
 
 
exclusive contracts and restrictions on application developers, contending
that these practices limited their ability to compete.142  Amazon, Microsoft,
and Yahoo all vilified the GBS project in various colorful terms.143  Such
protest invites a more aggressive form of antitrust intervention—one that 
may seek affirmatively to regulate the manner in which successful inventors
commercialize their inventions and chart future paths of innovation.  The 
question whether such antimonopolization lawsuits are desirable from
the standpoint of achieving positive increments in consumer welfare is 
difficult to answer.  As the Author explains below, however, aiming for 
a greater goal—welfare maximization—has potentially dangerous 
repercussions.  Specifically, taking an ideal form of behavior as a requisite 
of antitrust legality necessarily expands courts’ capacity to make Type I
errors, with negative consequences for public policy. 
IV. AN ANTITRUST OWN GOAL: THE LAW’S INADVERTENT 
ASSAULT ON CONSUMER WELFARE
This Article explores the nature of the consumer welfare gain necessary
to avert a Sherman Act violation.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals have 
given antitrust’s primary mode of analysis, the rule of reason, a broader
reading than the U.S. Supreme Court, requiring to varying degrees that a
challenged restraint accomplish more than a net increment in consumer
welfare.144  As explained above, this aspect of the law bears nefarious
potential and rests awkwardly with antitrust’s discrete role within industrial 
organization policy.145  More worryingly, however, the welfare-
maximization principle has transcended the section 1 context in which it
arose to silently embrace section 2 jurisprudence. 
This progression is particularly dangerous when applied to monopolization 
cases founded on innovation.  Part III addressed the complex and potentially 
sensitive economic factors that drive technological progress in the new 
economy.  No broad principles of general application have emerged as
142. See, e.g., Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? 
Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332
passim (2007), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol5/
iss2/5/.
143. See Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed Settlement at 19–20, Authors 
Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), 2009 
WL 4888799; Objections of Microsoft Corp. to Proposed Settlement & Certification of
Proposed Settlement Class and Sub-Classes at 1, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(No. 05 CV 8136-DC), 2009 WL 2980742; Objection of Yahoo! Inc. to Final Approval
of the Proposed Class Action Settlement at 24, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 
05 CV 8136-DC), 2009 WL 2980749. 
144. See, for example, the application of the rule of reason in the cases cited supra
note 1.
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to the relative merits of closed monopoly and open competition in 
spurring optimal R&D, yet the proliferation of IP-protected breakthrough 
innovations has recently produced a series of dominant positions.  In all 
cases, however, a showing that the impugned exclusionary act promotes 
long-run welfare discounted to present value should be determinative of
its legality. 
Why not push for more? The answer is because the immeasurable and 
unobservable counterfactual, which is crucial to LRA analysis, introduces a
systemic risk of judicial error that becomes increasingly unacceptable as
the stakes and risks of any given case rise.  The monopolization context
is uniquely problematic in this regard. 
To require more from a firm than that its conduct promote welfare is 
to introduce a perilous degree of risk.  A welfare-maximization principle 
exacerbates the likelihood of error by narrowing the band of legality
within the spectrum of behavior that actually promotes welfare.  A policy 
that requires more than a positive increment in aggregate welfare in the 
section 2 environment would have to assume that economic theory can 
identify the welfare-maximizing limit on unilateral conduct or, at an
absolute minimum, distinguish between trivial and significant contributions
to net welfare. Economics can accomplish neither such task in this setting. 
Economists have difficulty even determining whether a particular act of 
vertical integration or other potentially exclusionary behavior is beneficial 
or detrimental to consumers.146  To suppose that economics could offer 
more, enabling judges and juries to demarcate the optimal modes of 
unilateral behavior, is nothing more than a flight of fancy.147 
More recent events, however, suggest that the LRA principle has 
infiltrated the domain of unilateral behavior.  As the Author now
146. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 
U. CHI. L. REV. 229 passim (2005) (discussing economic virtues and low anticompetitive 
consequences of most vertical integration), with Joseph F. Brodley, Post-Chicago 
Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 683, 683 (1994) (advocating 
antitrust policy that limits vertical integration). See generally IIIB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 8–30 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the economics of
vertical integration). 
147. See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Convergence in the Treatment of Dominant Firm 
Conduct: The United States, the European Union, and the Institutional Embeddedness of 
Economics, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 951, 953 (2010) (“[U]nilateral conduct . . . is the area of
antitrust law where the role of economics is most contested . . . [and] presents economics
with particularly complex and uncertain issues of prognosis and analysis.”).  On the
limits of economic analysis in antitrust assessment of dominant-firm conduct, see Devlin 


















   
demonstrates, the past year’s events have brought the theoretical dangers 
of welfare maximization to fruition.  We have reached a point at which
the courts have affirmatively harmed consumers in the name of antitrust
enforcement.
A.  The GBS Project and Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Standard 
There is no better example of antitrust’s scoring an own goal on 
account of its efforts to maximize welfare than the debacle involving the 
GBS project.  If one credits the view that competition law should permit 
welfare-enhancing conduct, the case for antitrust condemnation of the
GBS settlement agreement, already amended to assuage concerns, was 
weak.  Although monopolization cases typically involve grave uncertainty 
as to whether the net effect of the challenged practice is positive or 
negative,148 there was no debate that the GBS settlement, if authorized 
by the court, would realize vast gains in consumer welfare.149  The only
conceivable antitrust objection to the proposed settlement was that although 
it was desirable, it did not represent the most favorable arrangement that
the litigating parties could have realized.  Judge Chin of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, sitting by designation on the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, found that competition concerns 
weighed against his approving the settlement150—a result that makes sense
only in light of a welfare-maximization lodestar. 
Before explaining the nature of the district court’s perverse antitrust 
ruling, it is necessary to explore both the issues implicated by the GBS 
project and the material provisions of the rejected settlement agreement. 
1. The Backdrop 
Collecting every significant piece of writing in existence and placing 
it all under one roof is a dream that has eluded mankind since the 
destruction of the Great Library of Alexandria two millennia ago.151 
Given the exponential growth in the volume of written works over time, 
148. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
149. See Elhauge, supra note 18, at 5 (“A holding that . . . [the] settlement violates 
antitrust law . . . [would] condemn[] us all to zero output of these books and an effective 
price of infinity for new copies of them. . . .  Even if the critics are right that no Google 
rival could overcome the barriers to entry in a similar way, a market with one competitor
is better than a market with none, because it increases market options and output from 
nothing to something, thus improving consumer welfare.”); see also Hausman & Sidak, 
supra note 7, at 437–38. 
150. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682–83, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
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aggregating all of the world’s books and articles has long been desirable, 
though infeasible.152  Even if it had been practically achievable, the scale
of the compiled information would frustrate efforts to synthesize and 
index it in a manner conducive to effective searching.153  Yet with the
advent of the digital age, organizing the world’s information became a 
real and achievable possibility.154  By scanning works, making their
contents available online, and formulating increasingly sophisticated search 
algorithms, society could at last have all of the world’s information at its 
fingertips.155  The long-term educational, scientific, cultural, and commercial
ramifications would be immeasurable. 
Yet, the fact that technological advance makes such a marvelous outcome 
possible does not make it inevitable. To translate the potential of the 
Internet and digital technology into reality, one must overcome a variety 
of intimidating obstacles.  First amongst them is the fact of intellectual
property.  Copyright laws, which have steadily and controversially 
expanded in recent decades, allow authors and their assigns to lay claim 
to a vast array of written work.156  Creating a digital copy of the entirety, 
or even a subset, of a book necessarily constitutes a copyright violation 
absent fair use protection.157 The law on fair use, however, is ill defined 
on this question, and so one wishing to copy the world’s books without 
committing what could turn out to be the most massive copyright
infringement in history must obtain permission.158  This leads to a second, 
albeit related, problem of identification and negotiation costs.  Simply
tracking down and bargaining with each copyright holder is preclusively
difficult, time-consuming, and expensive—factors that should but may
not spur a court to find that fair use applies.159  The third problem—a
152. See, e.g., Mary Murrell, Digital + Library: Mass Book Digitization as 
Collective Inquiry, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 221, 226–27 (2010). 
 153. See id. at 226–32. 
154. See, e.g., id. at 232–36. 
155. See, e.g., id.
156. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–106 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
157. See, e.g., Elisabeth Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. 10, ¶¶ 4–7, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1130&context=dltr. 
158. See, e.g., Guy Pessach, Museums, Digitization and Copyright Law: Taking 
Stock and Looking Ahead, 1 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 253, 269–70 (2007). See generally
Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 185, 185–86 (2007) (“Because fair use relies upon a vague, multi-factor test, it is
often impossible to know ex ante whether any particular use will qualify as fair.”).
159. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 















   
 
   
 
   
  
  
     
  
 
    
     
 
   
serious one—concerns the mechanics of scanning almost 130 million 
books160 within a lifetime.
Combined, these impediments would seem likely to dissuade any 
rational private enterprise from pursuing this goal in its pure form.
A more limited undertaking, which might involve scanning only those
books that are readily identifiable and lie in the public domain, would 
presumably be more attractive for sufficiently well-capitalized and driven
companies.  Yet, the result of even a successful operation to collect, scan, 
and make searchable out-of-copyright books would be a relatively
impoverished collection that lacks much contemporary work.161  From a
public policy standpoint—or at least one founded on utilitarianism—this 
leaves much to be desired.  Furthermore, even such a limited undertaking 
would involve considerable risks, as recent history reveals.  Microsoft 
tried and failed to create a digital library through the so-called Live 
Search Books project, which it abandoned in May 2008.162  It did not try 
to engage in unauthorized scanning.163  The Open Content Alliance, which 
Microsoft contributed to prior to abandoning its own scanning project, 
continues.164 
Given the legal and practical difficulties, creating a searchable online
database comprising all of the world’s writings, including those that are 
in copyright, seems a task better suited to government resolution, especially 
in light of the IP issues that seem deserving of legislative action.165 Yet 
there is an immediate problem in relying on government to effect such a 
monumental innovation, for bureaucratic regimes are rarely viewed as 
incubators of bold, visionary, and entrepreneurial technological progress.166 
160. See Leonid Taycher, Books of the World, Stand Up and Be Counted! All 
129,864,880 of You, GOOGLE BOOKS SEARCH (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:26 AM), http://booksearch.
blogspot.com/2010/08/books-of-world-stand-up-and-be-counted.html. 
161. It is well-established that most books lose their commercial value before the 
copyright on them expires.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 268 (2003) (app. 
to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting).  For a discussion of the respective limits and
advantages of the public domain, see Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public
Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (2003). 
162. See Satya Nadella, Book Search Winding Down, BING SEARCH BLOG (May 23, 
2008, 2:45 AM), http://www.bing.com/community/blogs/search/archive/2008/05/23/book- 
search-winding-down.aspx. 
163. See Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan To Make the World’s
Collection of Books Searchable, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006). 
164. See About: What Is the Open Content Alliance?, OPEN CONTENT ALLIANCE, 
http://www.opencontentalliance.org/about/ (last visited July 28, 2012). 
165. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Book Ruling Cuts Options for Google, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2011, at B1. 
166. See, e.g., JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, 
PRIVATE MEANS 140–42 (1989); Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth
Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1369 (2008); Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The 
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Enter Google, which has never been a company of small ambitions.
In 2002, cofounder Larry Page embarked on a series of trips to learn
about modest-scale digitization projects already under way, including at
the University of Michigan.167  There, he heard that the university expected
to finish scanning its library’s collection of seven million volumes in one 
thousand years.168 He told the university’s president that Google could
do it in six.169  Partnerships with the universities of Oxford, Harvard,
Stanford, and Michigan, as well as the New York Public Library, soon 
followed.170 
The company’s efforts proved explosively controversial.171  No one  
disputed that Google was making complete digital copies of vast numbers 
of in-copyright books.  In an effort to qualify for fair use protection,
Google ensured that users of the service could only see “snippets” of IP-
protected books.172  This was not enough to avoid the wrath of the
publishing industry, as both the Authors Guild of America (the Authors 
Guild) and the Association of American Publishers (AAP) brought lawsuits, 
alleging “massive copyright infringement.”173  Google countered on fair 
use grounds, arguing that digitizing books and maintaining copies of 
those books was no different in principle than copying and indexing 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945, 948–49 (1997); see also Christopher A. Padilla, Ass’t Sec’y of 
Commerce for Exp. Admin., Remarks at the American Conference Institute Export 
Control Conference: The Future of Export Controls (May 15, 2007), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2007/padilla05152007.htm (describing challenges the U.S. 
government faces in adapting to rapidly evolving technology). 
167. About Google Books: History of Google Books, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/




171. See, e.g., Jan Timothy Williams, The Pre-Amended Google Books Settlement, 
International Orphan Works, and German Copyright Law: An Analysis, 19 U. MIAMI 
BUS. L. REV. 51, 64 (2011).  For a representative objection, see Miguel Helft & Motoko 
Rich, Lawyer and Author Adds His Objections to Settling the Google Book Lawsuit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at B2. 
172. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright
Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479, 488; Kathleen E. Kubis, Note, Google Books: Page by
Page, Click by Click, Users Are Reading Away Privacy Rights, 13 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 217, 223 (2010). 
173. See Press Release, Authors Guild, Authors Guild Sues Google, Citing “Massive
Copyright Infringement” (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.authorsguild.org/
advocacy/articles/authorsguildsuesgooglecitingmassivecopyrightinfringement.html; Press
Release, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, Publishers Sue Google Over Plans To Digitize 
Copyrighted Books: Google Print Library Violates Publishers’ and Authors’ Rights (Oct. 
























websites.174  It also pointed out that it only made out-of-copyright copies
available for unabridged viewing online.175  Google had to vie with the fact,
however, that its copying of the works was commercial and likely 
nontransformative, such that at trial it would likely have had to prove a 
lack of market harm to rightsholders to prevail on fair use. 
In an act of ingenuity befitting its reputation, Google entered into a 
settlement agreement with the Authors Guild and AAP that put in place 
a framework that would not only compensate copyright holders through 
a sophisticated royalty system but would also allow Google to make all 
copyright-protected works both searchable and purchasable online,
including “orphan works”—books by authors who cannot be found.176 Part
of the genius of the agreement is that it would have made those orphan
works available for the first time to the consuming public.177  At present,
no company can produce copies of such books without risking subsequent 
copyright infringement should the rightsholders ever assert their IP. As
the next subpart explains, however, the settlement agreement proved to be
immensely divisive. 
2. The Settlement Agreement and Ensuing Controversy 
The original 2008 agreement encompassed all in-copyright works— 
excluding periodicals, music, personal papers, and public domain and 
government works—published before January 5, 2009.178  It required 
Google to pay the class members $45 million in compensation for its 
prior unauthorized digitization but authorized the company to continue
copying books, sell institutional subscriptions to the searchable electronic
GBS database, sell online access to individual works, and employ so-
called access uses.179  The arrangement also required Google to give
$34.5 million to establish and maintain a “Registry” that would act on 
behalf of the rightsholders by locating rightsholders, as well as collecting 
and distributing royalties to them.180  Class members would have received
sixty-three percent of the revenues earned from the GBS service, but
174. Answer, Jury Demand, and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Google Inc., 
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-
DC), 2005 WL 3309666. 
175. See, e.g., Eric Schmidt, Op-Ed., Books of Revelation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 
2005, at A18. 
176. See Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No.
05 CV 8136-DC), available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/agreement.html. 
177. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 18, at 17. 
178. See Settlement Agreement § 1.16, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d. 666 (No. 05 
CV 8136-DC), available at http://static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_ 
dlcp/books.google.com/en/us/booksrightsholders/Settlement-Agreement.pdf. 
179. Id. § 2.1(a)–(b). 
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could remove their books from the database or request that Google not
copy the same.181 
The settlement agreement drew an important distinction between 
“commercially available” and unavailable works, as well as between in-
print and out-of-print books.182  A book was commercially available and
presumptively in-print if the rightsholder made the book available for 
sale in the United States and not commercially available otherwise.183 
The distinction concerned the uses in which the agreement authorized
Google to engage.  The agreement permitted Google to engage only in 
“display uses” for books that were not commercially available—the 
company could engage in such uses for an available or in-print work
only with the relevant rightsholder’s permission.184  It granted Google
permission to engage in display uses for out-of-print works unless the
pertinent rightsholders requested otherwise.185 
The arrangement defined display uses as access and preview uses, as
well as snippet displays.186 In contrast, access uses involve viewing,
annotating, printing, and copying and pasting portions of the relevant 
book.187  The agreement permitted individual consumers to pay for online
access to the works and allowed educational, government, and corporate 
institutions to purchase time-limited subscriptions to the same.188 
Rightsholders could either set the sale price of their works themselves or
avail of a default pricing formula that sought to maximize revenues for 
sales of the books.189  The agreement also stated that Google would
provide, upon request, a free public access service for a computer terminal 
at each public library.190  Preview uses, as a default, allowed consumers
to view up to twenty percent of a work before making a purchase 
decision.191  In yielding results to a user’s search, Google could display 
approximately four lines of text—a snippet—from a work.192 
181. Id. § 2.1(a). 
182. Id. §§ 1.28, 3.2(d)(ii). 
183. Id. § 1.28. 
184. Id. §§ 1.48, 3.2(e)(i). 
185. Id. § 3.2(d)(ii). 
186. Id. § 1.48. 
187. Id. §§ 1.1, 4.1(d), 4.2(a). 
188. Id. §§ 1.74, 4.1(e). 
189. Id. § 4.2(b)(iii), (c)(i).
190. Id. § 4.8(a)(i)(1).
191. Id. § 4.3(b)(1).



















   
 
      
 
 
The agreement also provided for a “Research Corpus” containing 
digital copies of all scanned books made available for “non-consumptive 
research.”193  The parties agreed, however, to limit access to “qualified 
users,”194 a definition that Google’s competitors do not clearly meet.195 
Criticism was swift and biting, focusing in particular on the perceived 
fact that the settlement would bestow on Google a de facto monopoly 
over orphan works.196  Chicago antitrust expert Randal Picker provided 
what was perhaps the leading academic expression of this view.197  He 
also opined that the pricing algorithm could amount to an illegal joint-
pricing mechanism between horizontal competitors, namely, rightsholders.198 
The director of Harvard University Library decried the settlement on the 
ground that it “provides no assurance that the prices charged for access 
will be reasonable . . . especially since the subscription services will
have no real competitors.”199  Berkeley scholar Pamela Samuelson 
condemned the settlement for providing Google exclusive rights over 
orphan works, surmising that “[i]f asked, the authors of orphan books in
major research libraries might well prefer for their books to be available 
under Creative Commons licenses or put in the public domain so that 
fellow researchers could have greater access to them.”200  The Internet
Archive protested that the settlement provided Google alone immunity 
from copyright infringement for digitization of in-copyright books, thus 
preventing any other entity, itself included, from “provid[ing] some of
these same services due to the uncertain legal issues surrounding orphan 
193. Id. §§ 1.130, 7.2(b)(vi). 
194. Id. § 7.2(b)(vi). 
195. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New
Orphan-Works Monopoly?, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 383, 395 (2009). 
196. See, e.g., Robert Darnton, A Digital Library Better than Google’s, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2011, at A31 (quoting Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
197. See generally Picker, supra note 195 (concluding that the settlement gave 
Google unique access to orphan works). 
198. Id. at 390, 398. 
199. Laura G. Mirviss, Harvard-Google Online Book Deal at Risk, HARV.
CRIMSON (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2008/10/30/harvard-
google-online-book-deal-at-risk/.  Conversely, Michigan’s Paul Courant, despite noting
that the arrangement transformed Google’s original universal digital library into a bookstore, 
welcomed the settlement on the ground that it facilitated far quicker widespread consumer 
access to in-copyright books, as negotiating with each copyright holder directly would
have taken many years.  Paul Courant, The Google Settlement – From the Universal Library
to the Universal Bookstore, AU COURANT (Oct. 28, 2008), http://paulcourant.net/2008/10/28/ 
the-google-settlement-from-the-universal-library-to-the-universal-bookstore/. 
200. See Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The Dead Souls of the Google 
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books.”201  Virginia professor Siva Vaidhyanathan, despite professing
sympathy “to the claim that something is better than nothing and sooner 
is better than later,” criticized the settlement in light of “just how great
an alternative system could be, if everyone would just mount a long-
term, global campaign for it rather than settle for the quick fix.”202 
In November 2009, Google, the Authors Guild, and the AAP entered 
into an amended settlement, which differed in a number of material ways
from the 2008 agreement.203  First, the revised agreement did not
encapsulate foreign works, save those published in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and Canada.204  Second, it granted rightsholders the ability to
negotiate different revenue shares and permitted Google to engage in
price discounting.205  Third, it clarified that rightsholders can make their
works freely available or license them under Creative Commons or other 
licensing conditions.206  Fourth, it jettisoned the most-favored-nation 
clause that would have required the Book Rights Registry to offer Google 
terms at least equally favorable as those that it would offer third parties.207 
Perhaps most significantly, the new arrangement did not allow the 
parties to benefit from orphan work royalties, but instead created a trust 
that would hold the payments, use part of the money to fund the
rightsholder search process, and ultimately distribute the revenue cy pres
if the rightsholders were never identified.208  Last, but certainly not least, 
the revised settlement agreement modified the pricing algorithm that the 
Book Rights Registry would use in calculating a price for each book to 
simulate pricing in a competitive market.209  This was in distinction to
201. Letter from Hadrian R. Katz, Attorney for the Internet Archive, Arnold & 
Porter LLP, to Hon. Denny Chin, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y. (Apr. 17, 
2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/14308286/Internet-Archive-Intervention-
Google-Book-Search; see also Memorandum of Amicus Curiae the Internet Archive in 
Opposition to Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 08136-DC), 2010 WL 451142. 
 202. Siva Vaidhyanathan, My Initial Take on the Google-Publishers Settlement, 
GOOGLIZATION EVERYTHING (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.googlizationofeverything. 
com/2008/10/my_initial_take_on_the_googlep.php. 
203. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 176. 
204. Id. § 10.2(h). 
205. Id. § 4.5(a)(iii), (b). 
206. Id. § 4.2(a)(i).
207. Id. § 2.1; see also Yuan Ji, Comment, Why the Google Book Search Settlement 
Should Be Approved: A Response to Antitrust Concerns and Suggestions for Regulation, 
21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 231, 245 (2011). 
 208. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 176, § 6.3(a)(ii)(3). 
























   
 
 
the original agreement, which entailed an algorithm that would calculate 
price to maximize revenue for the rightsholders—a provision that some
commentators viewed as potentially enabling price collusion among
competing copyright holders.210 
These significant changes, however, failed to arrest the controversy.
To the surprise of the Author, the Justice Department filed an amicus 
brief, urging the district court not to approve the settlement.211  The  
government argued that the revised agreement still bestowed on Google 
a monopoly over orphan works, and purported to grant rights on the 
parties beyond those at issue in the underlying lawsuit.212 
3. The Court’s Opinion 
In a surprisingly terse opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York rejected the amended settlement agreement, based
in large part on its concern that the arrangement granted proprietary
rights over orphan works.213  The court viewed such an outcome with 
consternation, believing that it would improperly award Google for 
copying books without permission while denying its competitors rights 
to the in-copyright books for which the rightsholders could be found.214 
It expressed profound skepticism about the virtue of permitting private 
parties to effect such an arrangement in lieu of legislative action, opining 
that “the establishment of a mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books
is a matter more suited for Congress than this Court.”215  The fact that 
the settlement proposed to address a variety of issues not implicated by 
the issues presented by the lawsuit similarly concerned Judge Chin.216 
He concluded, however, that the parties would assuage his concerns if
they revised the agreement such that it would only encapsulate the works 
of those rightsholders who affirmatively opt in.217 
Antitrust concerns contributed to the district court’s decision not to 
approve the settlement agreement: 
  The United States, Amazon, and Microsoft, among others, raise a number of 
antitrust concerns presented by the ASA. 
210. See Picker, supra note 195, at 385. 
211. Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed
Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), 2010 WL 979111. 
212. See id. at 3–4; see also Miguel Helft, Justice Dept. Criticizes Latest Google 
Book Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at B2. 
213. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682, 686. 
214. Id. at 678–79. 
215. Id. at 677. 
216. Id.
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The ASA would give Google a de facto monopoly over unclaimed works. 
Only Google has engaged in the copying of books en masse without copyright 
permission.  As the United States observed in its original statement of interest:
This de facto exclusivity (at least as to orphan works) appears to create a
dangerous probability that only Google would have the ability to market to 
libraries and other institutions a comprehensive digital-book subscription.
The seller of an incomplete database—i.e., one that does not include the 
millions of orphan works—cannot compete effectively with the seller of a 
comprehensive product. 
And as counsel for the Internet Archive noted, the ASA would give Google 
“a right, which no one else in the world would have, . . . to digitize works 
with impunity, without any risk of statutory liability, for something like 150
years.”
The ASA would arguably give Google control over the search market.  The 
ASA would permit third parties to display snippets from books scanned by
Google, but only if they “have entered into agreements with Google.”  
Likewise, the ASA would permit third parties to “index and search” scanned
books only if they are non-commercial entities or they otherwise have Google’s 
prior written consent.  The ASA would broadly bar “direct, for profit, commercial 
use of information extracted from Books in the Research Corpus” except with
the express permission of the Registry and Google.  Google’s ability to deny 
competitors the ability to search orphan books would further entrench Google’s 
market power in the online search market. . . .  (See Mem. of Internet Archive in
Opp’n to ASA 3–4, ECF No. 811 (“Internet Archive Mem.”) (“Google would have 
the right to make complete copies of orphan works and use them for both 
display and non-display purposes, with no risk of copyright liability. 
Competitors that attempted to do the same thing, however, would face exposure
to statutory damages.”)).218 
These antitrust concerns upon which the district court relied possess 
an intuitive quality but are misplaced.  One could conclude otherwise 
only if one adopts the norm criticized throughout this Article that 
antitrust requires the best.
4. The Perversities of the Welfare-Maximization Principle 
Vexing policy questions pervade the GBS arrangement.  Is it acceptable
that a single dominant company should enjoy exclusive proprietary
control over orphan works, the owners of which have not issued licenses 
to reproduce and distribute the same?  Would Google engage in price 
gouging with respect to institutional subscribers that lack alternatives, or 
would reputational and other constraints keep the cost of GBS reasonable?
If the court approved the settlement, would Google’s exclusive ability to 






























sell access to orphan works endure?  Would it be feasible for third
parties to follow Google’s footsteps and create a rival digital library?  Is 
it appropriate, let alone desirable, that the agreement would leave
unanswered the crucially important legal question at issue in the GBS
lawsuit—does wholesale digital copying of entire works and making 
snippets of the same available online without permission from the 
relevant rightsholders qualify for protection under copyright’s fair use 
doctrine?  Would the continuing absence of legal certainty and the 
potentially catastrophic damages that would accompany a finding of
copyright infringement foreclose the emergence of viable substitute 
services?  If competitive entry is feasible, is it even desirable?  May it be 
that the cost of digitization is such that Google’s digital library is an
“essential resource” that would be inefficient to duplicate, in which case
the digital library of works is a natural monopoly deserving of regulation?
Could Google even be an inadvertent victim of collective monopoly on 
the part of rightsholders who, acting collectively, yield power over the 
GBS service? 
These and related questions have been the subject of intense debate
within the academic community and beyond.  More striking than these
questions’ complexity, however, is their utter irrelevance from an antitrust 
standpoint. Understanding why they are, in fact, immaterial is central to
appreciating the fact of and reasons for antitrust’s discrete function. 
No universal digital library predated the GBS project, nor did that 
project foreclose or otherwise hinder the private or public development 
of a rival database.219  Orphan works, by definition, are unavailable to
the consuming public absent the arrangement.220  It follows that, even if 
critics’ worst fears about the settlement were well-founded—such that 
Google would set monopoly prices and no rival service would likely
emerge—the GBS service constitutes a very significant addition to 
consumer welfare.  That alone should be enough to satisfy the antitrust 
laws.221 
219. To the contrary, Google’s efforts revealed valuable information to third-party
observers, thus reducing the cost to competitors of following suit.  See Hausman &
Sidak, supra note 7, at 429–32.  Criticism that the settlement left the fair use question
unaddressed, thus foreclosing viable entry, is an argument as to why Google’s risk-filled
project did not reveal even more information to competitors than it did.
220. See Alessandra Glorioso, Note, Google Books: An Orphan Works Solution?, 
38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 988 (2010). 
221. Academics opposed to the arrangement assume that antitrust requires more 
than an increase in consumer welfare. See, e.g., Picker, supra note 195, at 408; Pamela 
Samuelson, Google Books Is Not a Library, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2009, 12:38 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pamela-samuelson/google-books-is-not-a-lib_b_317
518.html (objecting that “Google will have a de facto monopoly on out-of-print books”
and observing that “[l]ibraries everywhere are terrified that Google will engage in price-
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Of course, courts could require more, thus presumably rendering
consumers even better off.  As explained above, however, this is a dangerous 
policy because courts are vulnerable to misreading the relevant 
counterfactual.222  It is all too easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to
underestimate the cost and risk that an innovator undertook in pursuing 
new technologies, and thus mistakenly assume that the inventor would 
have been willing to undertake an alternative, even more desirable 
course ex ante.  Google tells this story well—economists have estimated
that the company spent up to $100 million digitizing books and took an 
enormous risk in exposing itself to potentially incalculable damages in 
the event of established copyright infringement.223  That a private company 
would undertake such a risk-filled path in pursuit of an innovative, 
social-welfare-enhancing goal is a wonderful testament to the U.S. capitalist 
system.  A responsible innovation policy would work to foster incentives 
conducive to such socially valuable risk taking.
What folly it is, then, to second-guess such an innovator after the fact
and assume that the company would have been willing to undertake its 
trailblazing course of digitization had it known that the courts would not 
have allowed it to enter into a settlement agreement that encompassed
orphan works.  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, however, adopted precisely the wrong perspective—it supposed
that legislative action was the only appropriate avenue by which to make
orphan works commercially available.224 To say that Congress has been
a lumbering mule when it comes to envisioning, let alone realizing,
the full potential of digitization and universal libraries would be kind.225 
To envision a superior world in which the legislative branch acted with 
the foresight and ingenuity of private enterprise in a fast-growing
innovation market is one thing.  To appeal to such a hypothetical world as
222. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
223. See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 7, at 412 (citing David Chen, Google’s
Book Search Library Project Faces Legal Challenges, ILL. BUS. L.J. (Nov. 21, 2007), 
http://www.law.illinois.edu/bljournal/post/2007/11/21/Googles-Book-Search-Library-
Project-Faces-Copyright-Challenges.aspx). 
224. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
225. Congress has started a digitization project, but it does not approach the scale—
and hence the value—of the GBS project.  See, e.g., Katie Hafner, Google Gift to Digital 
Library, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at C6, available at 2005 WLNR 18838068 (“Long
on ambition, but short on the necessary funds, the Library of Congress has increasingly


























    
justification for fettering a real-life, second-best alternative, however, as
the district court did, is public policy of the most shortsighted kind.
The most striking perversity of the GBS case, however, lay in the 
district court’s insistence on a course that negatively impacts consumer 
welfare.  Judge Chin made it clear that he would approve a further
amendment to the settlement agreement to include as class members only 
those rightsholders who affirmatively opt in.226  That ruling will without
a doubt significantly reduce the number of books included within the 
GBS and will by definition exclude every orphan work.  This largely 
defeats the purpose of the GBS project and comes at the direct expense
of consumers.  Rarely does one witness a court employing a rule of law 
dedicated to advancing the interests of consumers to effect a significant
hurt upon them.  The ruling presumably reflects a rights-based conception 
of copyright that operates, in this instance, in opposition to utilitarian
concerns. 
To clarify, utilitarian considerations do not warrant stripping copyright
holders of their exclusive rights even if they stubbornly refuse to
commercialize or license their IP in a manner that would benefit the
larger world.  Few doubt that copyright law, unlike antitrust, displays
prominent features of a rights-based system.227  In this respect, the fact 
that the GBS service would enhance social welfare by scanning and 
making available copyrighted works against the wishes of rightsholders 
would not justify the copyright violation.  This does not mean, however, 
that courts should be blind to consequential public policy concerns in
determining the fact of consent.  It is dogmatic to suppose that a copyright 
holder can only give consent by affirmatively expressing the same, such
that passive acquiescence does not qualify.  In the Author’s view, the
fact of agreement occupies a spectrum within which there exists a range 
of legitimate consent.  Courts should appeal to public policy in defining 
that range. 
226. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 686. 
227. Of course, the U.S. Constitution provides a utilitarian justification for the IP 
laws, and, despite signing the Berne Convention, the United States has controversially
declined to recognize a moral rights justification for its copyright system.  See Brandi L. 
Holland, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States and the Effect of the Family 
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 on U.S. International Obligations, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 228–31 (2006).  Furthermore, one can argue with some force that 
the rights-based approach observed in U.S. copyright law has a utilitarian foundation
such that, even if violation of those rights in certain instances would enhance net utility, 
in the long run such violations would inure to the detriment of all.  Nevertheless, copyright 
displays a number of features that are irreconcilable with utilitarian considerations.  For 
instance, the law grants authors protection even in circumstances where IP law is not the
but-for cause of the writings, such as is the case with respect to dissertations and theses 
written in university.  Ryan M. Seidemann, Authorship and Control: Ethical and Legal 
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The law and economics literature has addressed the circumstances in 
which acquiescence should translate into legally cognizable consent.228 
Applied to the GBS settlement, requiring class members to opt out should 
not have been problematic because that feature of the agreement respects
the right of copyright holders to refuse permission, but also takes the
appropriate default position that authors would want to make their works 
available for the world to read and purchase.  Public policy ought not to 
be indifferent between default positions, for they matter enormously as a 
consequential matter.  The opt-out nature of the rejected GBS settlement
promised to bring millions of more books to the consuming public than
would a settlement founded on opt-in.  Judge Chin’s invitation to amend
the agreement to include only those authors who affirmatively grant
permission misses these points entirely, and perversely denies
consumers access to orphan works that they could otherwise have enjoyed. 
B.  Expanding the Scope of Section 2 Enforcement
The GBS settlement is the ultimate example of how using competition 
law to require optimal outcomes can ironically reduce consumer welfare.
The case is particularly illuminative because it lacks a feature that most 
antitrust cases display prominently—uncertainty as to whether enforcement 
proceedings against a challenged course of conduct will ultimately inure 
to the public benefit.  It was an undeniable fact that the GBS arrangement
would have enhanced consumer welfare, yet the district court declined to
approve it.  In this respect, the case implicitly—though far from subtly— 
embraced the principle enshrined in the LRA rule that “mere” welfare
enhancement does not render an act conclusively legal under the antitrust 
laws.
The GBS case differs from most in which the courts have explicitly 
applied the LRA rule, however, because it does not involve a horizontal 
agreement as to Google.229 Instead, the case is better understood as a 
vertical arrangement that bestows Google with a dominant position in
the distribution of a comprehensive digital library that includes orphan 
works, which are not available in physical or digital form anywhere 
228. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.3 (8th ed. 2011). 
229. There is a horizontal element to the arrangement, however, between rightsholders





















    
  





    
    
 
else.230  Thus, the vertical arrangement promised to create a new, albeit 
monopolized, market.  Although section 1 of the Sherman Act applies to 
vertical agreements, one can more meaningfully analyze the GBS
arrangement through the lens of section 2,231 which governs actual and
attempted monopolization, as well as conspiracies directed toward the 
same—for our purposes, Google’s supposed monopolization of orphan 
works.232  For the reasons explained above, the judiciary’s decision not 
to approve the settlement agreement effected a significant harm to 
welfare.233  That the parties did not mold the arrangement in such a way 
as to achieve the maximum feasible benefit for consumers is no ground
for antitrust concern absent a compelling reason to think that a less 
lucrative agreement would have provided sufficient impetus to the 
innovator, Google, to pursue the course that it did.  This is the best 
contemporary example of why construing antitrust through a regulatory
lens can lead to perverse outcomes.
The harm occasioned by antitrust’s implicit requirement of welfare 
maximization in the field of unilateral conduct, however, is not limited
to the case of Google Books, which was in some respects sui generis.
This Author argues that quiet adoption of the LRA principle under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, particularly when applied to innovation-
based markets, bears unique dangers and thus should be opposed.234 
These dangers emanate from the grave uncertainty that is a hallmark of 
230. Cf. Eric M. Fraser, Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The Problem of 
Simultaneity, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10–11 (Sept. 24, 2010), http://stlr.stanford.edu/2010/ 
09/antitrust-and-the-google-books-settlement/ (describing the settlement agreement
as having a similar effect as a horizontal agreement between competitors).
231. See, e.g., Perington Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 631 F.2d 1369, 
1377 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Traders oriented vertically to each other can be found in 
violation of section 2 by conspiring to monopolize one horizontal market intersecting the 
vertical arrangement.”).
232. Notably, the procedural posture of the GBS settlement required the court to 
consider whether the proposed agreement satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(e), which requires courts to determine whether settlements are “fair, reasonable, and
adequate” to the class members—in the GBS case, rightsholders.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  
It is not clear that antitrust rules should apply to this calculus.  C. Scott Hemphill, 
Comment, Collusive and Exclusive Settlements of Intellectual Property Litigation, 2010
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 685, 701–02.  Nevertheless, because the district court saw fit to
consider the public interest effects of the settlement from an antitrust perspective, it is 
appropriate to use the GBS case as an important illustration of how the norms underlying
the LRA rule have transcended rule of reason cases to encapsulate monopolization cases. 
233. See supra Part IV.A.4.
234. See also Manne & Wright, supra note 16, at 185 (“[I]nnovation is closely
related to antitrust error. . . .  This bias is likely to do even more damage when economists 
have less systematic theoretical and empirical knowledge about the relationship between 
competition and innovation on policy-relevant margins than they do about other
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monopolization actions.  Pertinent counterfactuals are rarely as elusive 
as they are in those settings. 
Explaining the propensity for error requires a brief return to Part III of 
the Article.  Although concentrated markets can yield less-than-desirable 
levels of price competition and innovation, depending on the circumstances, 
they can also act as incubators of innovation.235  Unfortunately, the
economics literature has yet to produce a reliable prescription capable of 
broad application regarding the relative virtues of competition and
dominance in yielding greater rates of invention.236 Nevertheless, both 
theory and evidence suggest that competition in some form is a prerequisite
of consistently high rates of innovation, especially of groundbreaking
technologies that tend to disrupt the status quo.237  This competition, 
however, need not take the form of price wars amongst numerous rivals. 
That is, competition is not synonymous with an unconcentrated market
structure comprised of a significant number of companies.  Instead, IP
and other legally recognized appropriation mechanisms can deflect
competition from active sales in the marketplace to technology races in
the laboratory, and may in fact feed greater levels of dynamic efficiency, 
albeit at cost to static efficiency.238  The fact that an industry may be
highly concentrated, therefore, does not necessarily mean that competition 
is absent.  From an enforcement perspective, however, the fact that
monopoly market share and competition are consistent complicates the 
question whether circumstances warrant antitrust intervention. 
As long as third-party researchers maintain active levels of R&D, and
as long as they possess means to commercialize new technologies either
themselves or through licensees, their presence will spur ongoing
innovation by incumbent monopolists.  Incumbents that fail to stay ahead
of the pack will find their seemingly secure monopolies quickly eroded, 
an observation for which the history of new economy industries founded
on innovation provides much evidence.239 Google and Apple’s continuing 
evisceration of Microsoft’s previously unassailable market positions are
good contemporary examples.240 
235. See supra Part III.A. 
236. See supra Part III.A. 
237. See supra Part III.A. 
238. See supra Part III.A. 
239. See Posner, supra note 127, at 930. 
240. See Robert Cyran & Martin Hutchinson, At Microsoft, Bing Too Costly To
Keep, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011, at B2; Editorial, Remember Microsoft?, N.Y. TIMES, 






























     
 
  
This suggests that antitrust policy in technology markets should concern 
itself less with policing high levels of industry concentration and more 
with incumbents’ exclusionary practices that fetter rivals’ ability to 
introduce potentially superior technologies.241  Unfortunately, the economics 
of exclusion are hotly debated, and little consensus has emerged as to the 
likely efficacy of dominant-firm practices in foreclosing the emergence 
of rival-marketed technologies.242  As a result, context-specific analysis
is necessary to determine the need for antitrust actions to protect
competition in innovation in any particular case.
Such is the unfortunate reality of antitrust oversight of monopolistic 
practices in innovation markets.  As a result, enforcement actions against
dominant-firm conduct in high-technology markets display unique
difficulties.  Enforcers must grapple with the preceding characteristics of
innovation markets and attempt the laborious and imprecise process of
determining whether a challenged practice is injurious to consumers.243 
Such determinations take place without the benefit of empirical evidence 
favoring intervention or noninvolvement, and necessarily involve tradeoffs
with immeasurable long-run effects. 
In determining whether a practice is harmful by virtue of its being
likely to perpetuate monopoly conditions or frustrate the emergence of
competing technologies, principles of decision theory come to the fore. 
Economists generally believe that Type I errors—incorrectly finding that 
dominant-firm conduct is monopolist—are more serious than Type II
iCloud Service, WASH. POST, June 7, 2011, at A10, available at 2011 WLNR 11320863;
Martin Peers, A Window into Microsoft’s Profit Outlook, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2010, at 
B16; Seth Schiesel, Game Changer: Downtime Becomes a Pastime, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2011, at F1.
241. Accord ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 34 
(2007), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps81352/amc_final_report.pdf
(“Economic research found procompetitive reasons to explain highly concentrated
markets—that is, that the most efficient firms were winning the competitive struggle and
thereby achieving high market shares.”).
242. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 
498 n.117 (2010). 
243. To take but one topical example, consider the debate over network neutrality. 
Proponents of such a doctrine fear that broadband Internet service providers have 
incentives to give preferential treatment to certain forms of content and may even block
applications or conduct from companies with which they compete in an upstream or
downstream market.  See, e.g., Tim Wu & Christopher Woo, Keeping the Internet 
Neutral?, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 581–82 (2007).  Opponents of net neutrality rely on
competition and the economic incentives possessed by network operators to maximize 
the value of the network to consumers as adequate protections against abuses and also 
point out that certain forms of discrimination are in fact efficient.  See, e.g., id. at 575– 
76. Much of the debate centers on currently improvable assumptions concerning both
the curative powers of competition in network industries and the tendency of
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errors—incorrectly approving collusive practices—because the market
will eventually correct the latter, but may be unable to remedy the former.244 
This suggests that enforcers should err on the side of nonenforcement in 
situations of uncertainty.  But what should be the extent of that bias?
Even if one decides that a dominant-firm practice is sufficiently problematic 
that policy requires its arrest, one must weigh both the cost of enforcement 
and the practical remedial limitations accompanying even a successful
suit.  Monopolization actions are typically protracted such that, in quickly
evolving technology markets, what may have once been a problematic
exclusionary practice may be an anachronism of history by the time a
court considers remedies.245 Even if anticompetitive conditions endure, 
antitrust remedies directed at spurring competition in monopolized
industries are famously ineffectual.246  As a result, sound policy requires 
establishing not only that a particular practice is exclusionary, but also 
that the net effect of costly antitrust proceedings is likely to be positive.247 
This brings us to the issue of welfare maximization.  When it is 
difficult to determine the merits of an impugned practice by a dominant 
firm, one might view the question whether antitrust requires the most, or 
simply more, as inconsequential.  In other words, the indeterminate long-
term impact of unilateral dominant-firm behavior is presumably a neutral
fact, making a strong case for neither aggressive enforcement nor liberal 
laissez-faire policy.  This view would be incorrect, however, for two 
reasons.  First, errors in different directions carry distinct costs that may
244. For the classic discussion of this position, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); see also Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly: How Motions To Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 68 (2007) (assigning more weight to Type I errors).  For an opposing
view, see William Kolasky, The Justice Department’s Section 2 Report: A Mixed Review, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2008, at 1, 4, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct08_FullSource10_27f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
245. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Oligopoly Policy and the Ethyl Corp. Case, 65 OR. L. 
REV. 73, 93–94 (1986). 
246. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political 
Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 616–17 (2010) (summarizing the Chicago School view as to why
monopolization enforcement is likely to be ineffective and counterproductive); Einer 
Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 87 (2009); John 
E. Lopatka, Assessing Microsoft from a Distance, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 811, 813–14 
(2009). 
247. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the 
Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 639 (2005) (“[A]ntitrust 



























justify a systemic preference in favor of either Type I or Type II errors.248 
Second, and of principal relevance to this Article, the view that the 
uncertain economic effect of monopolistic conduct supports neither under-
nor over-enforcement assumes that consumer harm does not encapsulate
opportunity cost. 
In fact, demanding that unilateral conduct do more than bring about a 
positive increment in consumer welfare shifts the legality condition in a 
troubling way.  Specifically, requiring the best possible, or even a better-
than-positive, outcome for consumers in cases of uncertainty narrows the 
zone of permissible unilateral behavior to a small subset of what is in 
fact socially desirable conduct.  This effect enhances the probability of 
judicial Type I errors.  The danger is that enforcement agencies may seek to
engineer superior market outcomes by using the antitrust laws as a form
of industry regulation—a goal that may compound false positives to the 
long-term detriment of consumers. 
The nature of this risk requires some elaboration because it is not 
immediately obvious.  As noted in the introduction, there are competing 
definitions of consumer harm, and the differences matter enormously.  In 
a world of perfect legal and factual certainty—both ex ante and ex post— 
consumer harm is synonymous with any departure from the welfare-
maximizing path.  It is the actors’ limited ability to determine the factual
and legal consequences of their behavior, and the courts’ restricted capacity 
to construct the necessary counterfactual, that creates a spectrum, rather
than a point, of consumer benefit.  As we obviously live in a world
where legal certainty does not prevail and where courts routinely err, the 
law should define consumer injury without reference to opportunity
cost.249  If a challenged restraint brings about or otherwise facilitates an
increase in purchasers’ well-being, as compared to a world in which the
defendant did not act at all, the relevant behavior benefits consumers and 
should therefore be lawful.  The only exception should be where 
enforcement agencies and courts can reliably construct the relevant
counterfactual and accurately conclude whether the defendant would 
have followed a better course were the law to forbid the company’s 
preferred, though less consumer-friendly, course. 
Not all counterfactuals are hopelessly indeterminate.  Indeed, the
Author’s view that the law should ignore opportunity cost in defining
consumer injury reflects the premise that courts can demarcate the but-
for world in which the defendant eschewed any form of substitute 
248. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
75 (2010) for the Author’s extended discussion of error analysis in antitrust jurisprudence. 
249. To be specific, this is the opportunity cost associated with substitute behavior 
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behavior and simply declined to act at all.  That particular counterfactual 
is easier to construct, however, than the multitudinous ones in which a 
company may or may not have undertaken specific forms of conduct that 
are more conducive of consumer benefit than the practice at hand.250  It
is only where a court can determine the nature of the relevant counterfactual
with complete confidence that one can reliably argue that consumers can
be injured by a beneficial, though not ideal, arrangement.  As courts can
rarely, if ever, make such a factual finding with the requisite confidence, 
and because no effective limiting principle exists, the LRA rule is 
misplaced. 
To appreciate the danger of applying welfare-maximization principles 
to dominant-firm conduct, consider the following example. Suppose that 
an innovative company achieves a dominant position on the basis of its 
technologically superior product.  In order to maintain its monopoly, the
company devotes considerable resources to R&D, thus continuously
improving its flagship good, though it also engages in an ancillary 
practice that is simultaneously attractive to its customers and
disadvantageous to its fringe rivals.  This practice is volume discounting, 
which allows the monopolist to achieve scale efficiencies, though the 
conduct generates potentially offsetting exclusionary effects.251  Does  
consumer harm exist? 
To answer this question, one must determine the but-for world in
which the dominant company declined to undertake the impugned 
practice—volume discounting—at all.  If consumers would be better off 
without the discounting—that is, with flat-rate pricing—then that conduct 
injures them under any definition of “injury,” and an antitrust violation 
should follow.  If discounting with scale yields net gains for purchasers 
vis-à-vis fixed pricing, however, then consumers are “better off” in the
250. As explained above, this is not to say that a court can never appropriately
impose antitrust liability for declining to pursue an obviously less restrictive but equally
effective agreement.  The LRA rule may be appropriate where the court, ex post, can be
confident that its finding of a Sherman Act violation would not have induced the 
defendants to decline to act at all ex ante.  It is critical, however, that the courts cabin
such findings to the narrow circumstances in which such confidence is justified.  The
Author is of the view, however, that monopolization cases are categorically inappropriate
subjects for welfare-maximization principles. 
251. It should be borne in mind that a competitor’s “efficiency” does not necessarily
refer to the marginal cost at which that rival operates because that metric is typically
contingent on scale, and hence, contingent. 
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sense used by this Article.  In the Author’s view, this should in itself
demonstrate the absence of a Sherman Act violation.
What if the law, however, interjected with an additional question:
would a different form of volume discounting yield even greater gains 
for consumers and still provide comparable efficiency gains to the
dominant firm?  For instance, a court could find that less severe discounting 
would allow the monopolist to achieve similar scale efficiencies, but 
would have less detrimental an effect on rivals’ ability to expand output 
from fringe positions in the market.  To be sure, less pronounced discounts 
harm the firm’s consumers, but they would also increase the propensity
for long-term competition.  If the benefits of that long-term competition 
outweighed the higher average selling prices in the short run, antitrust 
condemnation of the volume discounting would follow. 
In a perfect world—one characterized by zero judicial error and legal
certainty—policy considerations would justify courts’ making the legality
of a dominant-firm practice contingent on its being the most consumer-
friendly version possible.  In reality, however, such an approach would
introduce another confoundingly difficult question into the antitrust
calculus.  Every time a court made a Type I error in determining whether
the welfare-enhancing practice before it was the best possible such
practice—and one would expect that the judiciary would make such
errors regularly—the law would condemn a unilateral practice that benefits 
consumers.  Such perversities would be justified only if the effect of a 
rule requiring the best possible variant of an efficient practice would be 
to induce monopolists to undertake consistently superior courses of
action.  Given companies’ limited means to foresee the outcomes of judicial 
analysis under section 2, in addition to the judiciary’s incapacity to
engage reliably in the fact-finding necessary for accurate monopolization 
analysis, such an effect seems most unlikely. 
This risk is by no means limited to the example of loyalty discounting.
The law could always second-guess the consumer-benefitting acts of
exclusive contracting, product tying, low or “predatory” pricing, loyalty 
rebates, and vertical integration, and suppose that material modifications 
of the behavior would give consumers an even better deal. 
This is no academic threat, but goes to the very heart of the antitrust 
enterprise.  If the LRA rule informs the jurisprudential meaning of 
consumer harm, it is unlikely that those responsible for enforcing the law 
will embrace the welfare-maximization principle only in a narrow subset
of circumstances.  Instead, that principle is apt to inform one’s
understanding of antitrust law, as well as the nature of commercial
practices that that body of law seeks to arrest.  The highly publicized
Google Books Search settlement agreement reveals that the LRA mindset 
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with the scores of commentators who decried the monopoly-producing 
nature of the arrangement.  Has the goal of welfare maximization corrupted
monopolization proceedings under section 2?  The answer is not obvious, 
for enforcement agencies have little incentive to announce that their 
principal objection to a dominant firm’s practice is that it is does not 
benefit consumers quite as much as they would like. 
In one respect, it is clear that the welfare-maximization principle does 
not find unqualified application in the realm of unilateral behavior.  It
has long been settled that even dominant firms enjoy considerable
freedom in tailoring their behavior, and it is unlikely that the law will
widely seek to micromanage unilateral conduct to achieve optimal
adjustments to welfare-enhancing conduct.252  Yet, a form of analysis
under section 2 known as “the unnecessarily restrictive conduct test” 
suggests that a variant of the LRA rule is indeed present.253 
In the Author’s view, there is a significant risk that is both subtle and 
insidious.  Specifically, the welfare-maximization principle is most
likely to inform agency and judicial determinations silently at the margin. 
In concentrated technology markets, agencies may observe high levels of 
R&D that translate into ongoing positive increments in consumer welfare 
but also see propriety control that provides the dominant incumbent
systemic advantages for conducting follow-on innovation.  Public choice 
theory predicts, accurately as it turns out, that out-competed companies
will often seek recourse through the judicial process generally, and antitrust 
laws in particular.254  Bombarded by competitor complaints and buoyed
by the successful company’s dominant market share, enforcement agencies 
may decide that even though the status quo is consumer-friendly and highly
innovative, intervention may facilitate even better outcomes. Recent
enforcement actions against Intel, Apple, and Google suggest that this 
may indeed have occurred. 
252. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 397–98 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“Part of competing like everyone else is the ability to make decisions about with 
whom and on what terms one will deal. . . .  In general, then, even a firm with significant 
market power has no duty to deal with certain suppliers or distributors . . . .”).
253. See Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic 
Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 659 (1999). 
254. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1055, 1073–74 (2010).  But cf. Shubha Ghosh & Darren Bush, Predatory 
Conduct and Predatory Legislation: Exclusionary Tactics in Airline Markets, 45 HOUS. 




   
 
   
 
  










   






    
  
Spatial constraints foreclose detailed discussion of these recent
monopolization actions, but a brief discussion makes the danger clear. 
Apple launched the first version of its wildly successful iPhone on June
29, 2007, with AT&T providing exclusive coverage.255  This innovation 
invited a wave of lawsuits alleging that the exclusionary contracts violated
the antitrust laws.256  Academics hostile to closed over open systems
object to such exclusivity on the ground that consumers would be better
off if they enjoyed choice as to their preferred wireless provider.257 
What these views and the accompanying lawsuits fail to consider is why 
the appropriate point of reference is the best possible outcome for 
consumers as opposed to the state of the world in which no iPhone 
innovation occurred at all.  As explained above, systemic judicial error 
and ex ante legal uncertainty make the former reference point a generally
undesirable one.  As there is no dispute that consumers are better off 
with inventions like the iPhone with incidental contractual restraints than
they are with no such invention, this is all that antitrust should require in 
the section 2 setting.  The fact that the lawsuits prove enduring is of 
great concern, and suggests that a silent LRA principle underlies section 
2 analysis. 
The controversy concerning Apple’s iPhone was by no means unique—
the earlier introduction of the iPod, and more recent launch of the iPad,
invited great controversy because of the lack of interoperability.258 Once 
more, competition concerns arose because consumers, although displaying 
an overwhelming demand for the new product, would have preferred if it 
operated as part of an open system. 
255. See Brian X. Chen, June 29, 2007: iPhone, You Phone, We All Wanna iPhone, 
WIRED (June 29, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2009/06/day
intech_0629/. 
256. See, e.g., In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litig., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1306
(N.D. Cal. 2008); see also Matt McMurrer, Note, Exclusive Gadget: Apple & AT&T 
Antitrust Litigation and the iPhone Aftermarkets, 36 J. CORP. L. 495 (2011) (providing
an overview of the antitrust litigation related to the iPhone’s exclusionary contracts). 
257. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, INT’L J. COMM. 389, 398–99 (2007), 
http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/152/96 (critiquing the retail barriers omnipresent
in the mobile phone industry). 
258. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, IPad Service Draws Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2011, at B4; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119, 1126–27 (2007) (discussing competition concerns related
to the iPod’s interoperability constraints); Jane Winn & Nicolas Jondet, A New Deal for 
End Users? Lessons from a French Innovation in the Regulation of Interoperability, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 555–56 (2009) (linking France’s desire to regulate 
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More recently, in late June 2011, the FTC announced a formal
antitrust investigation of Google’s Internet-search algorithm.259 The
economics at play in this industry are fascinating but complex, and thus 
require more detailed treatment than is possible within the confines of 
this Article.260  It bears noting that Google’s dominant position, founded
on a history of sustained qualitative superiority over its rivals, continues 
to produce consumer-welfare-enhancing innovation.  A concern with 
Google’s vertical integration underlies the investigation,261 which suggests 
that the FTC is worried that further entrenchment by Google may not be
as conducive of competition, and hence not as productive to consumer 
welfare, as is possible.  It is possible that alleged bias in Google’s search
results could harm long-term consumer welfare discounted to present
value, but it seems to the Author that, given the extraordinary rate of
innovation in the markets involved, the likelihood that Google’s practices 
are injurious to welfare is slight.  If this is indeed the case, the FTC’s
view is, in effect, regulatory.  The FTC may be taking aim at Google’s
primary service, which has been overwhelmingly successful in the United 
States based on its superiority, and concluding that it could be better. 
A desire to maximize consumers’ well-being, rather than accept current 
and ongoing consumer benefits, is misplaced in this section 2 setting for
all the reasons explored above.262 
Finally, the recent FTC action against Intel for the chipmaker’s loyalty 
discount policies is also worrisome in this regard.263  Economic analysis
suggests that the attacked pricing caused no consumer harm, at least in
the short run, which suggests that the agency’s primary goal in bringing 
the suit was to engineer market conditions more conducive to long-run
259. See Jessica Guynn & Jim Puzzanghera, FTC Launches Investigation of Google, 
L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/25/business/la-fi-google-ftc-
20110625. 
260. For an interesting representative discussion, see Josh Wright, Search Bias and
Antitrust, TRUTH ON MARKET (Mar. 24, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/03/ 
24/search-bias-and-antitrust/.
 261. Guynn & Puzzanghera, supra note 259. 
262. See supra Part IV.B.  It also bears noting that the other merits of the case are 
questionable.  The switching barriers that lock consumers into Google’s search engine 
are unusually low, and an appropriate remedy is most unclear—the idea that the 
government would have to approve continuous changes in the company’s algorithm is 
disturbing, given the history of regulators’ stymieing rapid innovation when placed in a 
position of approving technological alterations in far less innovative and more slow-
moving industries. 
263. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman 
























entry.264  As explained above, however, asking whether a company could
substitute a consumer-friendly pricing practice for one that is more
facilitative of rival expansion introduces an additional factual element 
into the antitrust analysis—one that courts are far from well-placed to
address.  Indeed, by requiring more than a showing that the challenged
practice benefits consumers, the law enhances the risk of Type I errors at
great potential risk to the very goal that the law purports to champion. 
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust is suffering an identity crisis.  Properly understood as a 
prophylactic device aimed at arresting practices that are harmful to 
consumer welfare, the courts have steadily transformed this area of law
into something different.  Undoubtedly with noble intentions, the judiciary 
has rewritten the rule of reason to require the best outcome available, 
rather than a mere improvement.  Given the ex post posture in which courts 
operate—characterized by hindsight bias and a concomitant temptation to
conflate possible outcomes with necessarily attainable ones—it is perhaps
unsurprising that judges would seek to engineer superior market outcomes 
when they can identify less restrictive alternatives to impugned conduct. 
The danger, however, is at once subtle, systemic, and serious. 
This phenomenon is perhaps a manifestation of the reversed aphorism 
that easy cases make bad law.  Confronted with actions in which defendants
had adopted a practice that was simultaneously efficient and injurious of 
rivals’ ability to compete on equal footing, courts may understandably
insist that the defendant companies eschew one practice in favor of
another that is equally efficient but more facilitative of competition. 
Especially in cases involving entrenched dominance or the emergence of
new markets—through a joint venture, for example—requiring competitors 
not to pull the ladder up behind them when less detrimental alternatives
exist arguably promotes Kenneth Arrow’s view of competition by helping 
to ensure equality of opportunity. 
Yet, two serious problems emerge.  First, the LRA test lacks a theoretical 
limiting principle.  Literally applied, it would preclude all manner of 
ubiquitous—and desirable—business arrangements, including joint ventures
and mergers.  The fact that the courts have not applied the test in this 
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Commission’s Complaint Against Intel (ICLE Antitrust & Competition Policy White
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manner is not a convincing defense of the rule, but instead demonstrates 
its incoherence. 
Second, and more seriously, by injecting a high-level view that
antitrust focuses on maximizing, rather than simply improving, welfare, 
the law invites findings of antitrust violations in high-stakes cases where 
courts cannot reliably identify the relevant counterfactual.  The problem 
here is partially one of precedential cabining.  By applying the LRA test
in obvious cases—those where the defendants could easily have followed 
an equally effective course without impeding competition as much or at 
all—the courts open more complex cases to similar treatment.  Crucially, 
however, both the judicial capacity to err and the magnitude of the social
cost involved in courts’ mistakes rise sharply as the difficulty and the 
stakes of any given case increase.
The Author argues that the courts’ construction of the Sherman Act
requiring more than a progression in welfare improperly conflates antitrust 
with regulation.  Unfortunately, courts have not limited this misguided 
principle to proceedings involving concerted behavior.  Instead of
focusing the LRA inquiry on contractual restraints on competition alone, 
the judiciary and enforcement agencies have adopted the principle of 
welfare maximization in monopolization cases. This phenomenon
is seriously problematic, especially in cases where defendant companies
achieved their monopoly status on account of significant and ongoing 
innovation.  Here, both the proclivity for and cost of false positives are 
at their peak, rendering the law’s requirement of the best to be especially
perverse.
This improper adoption of the welfare-maximization principle reached
its logical conclusion in the Google Books Search case.  Unfortunately,
the harm is unlikely to stop there.  A variety of recent actions portend a
troubling rise in authorities’ attempts to employ antitrust as an affirmative
tool of public policy, instead of using it as a barrier against social-
welfare-reducing activities. By seeking to facilitate more open competition 
in the future by restricting practices that are undeniably efficient today,
antitrust enforcers may paradoxically provide consumers with less.
The Author urges the judiciary to reorient antitrust jurisprudence toward 
its traditional and proper mandate, which is to prohibit practices that are 
apt to harm consumers, and to do so only when such harm is not
incidental to the company’s legitimate exercise of market power.  The 
courts and enforcement agencies would do well to recall one of the key
principles underlying the field of antitrust law: it is not regulation. 
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